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Since September 11, 2001, a collection of bills have been submitted to Congress 
proposing to amend section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide that an 
individual may lose United States citizenship for joining a terrorist organization, or 
engaging in or supporting terrorism. Although several of our allies, including the U.K., 
Australia, and France, have considered and in some instances passed similar legislation 
during the same period, Congress has not given these proposals serious consideration.   
This thesis provides a policy analysis, assessing the viability of terrorism-related 
loss of citizenship under U.S. law. Following a review of the history of acquisition and 
loss of citizenship in the United States, including key laws and precedent decisions, and a 
comparative analysis of legislation considered and either passed or rejected by the U.K., 
Australia, and France, it provides a critical review of terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
bills submitted to Congress since 9/11. This thesis demonstrates that viable terrorism-
related loss of citizenship legislation may be possible, but that bills submitted to date 
have been largely symbolic, rather than serious, efforts. This thesis provides drafting 
recommendations to legislators, but raises questions about the practical utility and 
necessity of such laws. 
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The momentous and tragic events of September 11, 2001, altered the course of 
our nation.  Terrorism, and particularly terrorist violence perpetrated by Islamist groups, 
became the motivating force for a series of enormously consequential legislative, policy, 
and procedural changes reflecting the perception that a new and persistent threat to 
Americans at home, and to the homeland itself, had arrived.  The balance of liberty and 
security in America seemed in need of adjustment, and the importance of protection and 
safety were prioritized.  Congress undertook a variety of measures aimed at improving 
our homeland security and responding to the threat of global terrorism, the success and 
necessity of which remain debated issues.   
One of the legislative efforts that began shortly after 9/11, and that has been 
persistently championed by a collection of Senators and Representatives through to the 
current Congress without evident success, has been the effort to amend U.S. law to allow 
for the possibility that a U.S. citizen could lose citizenship as a result of joining a foreign 
terrorist organization, or supporting or furthering the cause of terrorism. This thesis 
explores the modern pursuit of a new terrorism-related loss of citizenship law, and in 
doing so examines fundamental questions about the nature of United States citizenship. Is 
U.S. citizenship a privilege that entails a collection of duties and obligations, and that is 
subject to revocation? Or is it a protected legal status that guarantees the holder a 
collection of critically important rights and protections, and that cannot be forcibly 
withdrawn? 
This thesis begins by tracing the history of acquisition and loss of citizenship in 
America back to the birth of the Republic.  As a fledgling nation, America in the 19th 
century struggled to assert and defend the rights of naturalized citizens against the claims 
of perpetual loyalty and obligation asserted by their birth nations, even as we struggled to 
accept the notion that African slaves and their American-born children might have a 
claim to citizenship.  Shortly after the end of the Civil War, the federal government took 
a collection of important steps that helped determine the fate of citizenship and loss of 
citizenship in the U.S.   
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In 1868, within weeks of each other, the 14th Amendment was adopted, and the 
Expatriation Act of 1868 was passed into law.  The 14th Amendment guaranteed the 
birthright citizenship of people born in the United States, and put naturalized and natural 
born citizens of the U.S. on equal constitutional footing.  Two weeks later, the 
Expatriation Act of 1868 declared publically to the world America’s position on loss and 
acquisition of citizenship.  Congress declared that people have a fundamental right to 
throw off the cloak of citizenship, with all attendant obligations, and naturalize as citizens 
of another nation.  To that end, it further declared the expectation that foreign nations 
respect the citizenship of all U.S. citizens, including naturalized U.S. citizens who may 
have previously been citizens of foreign nations.  Although this statutory declaration was 
intended to protect U.S. citizens, it had the notable effect of acknowledging the existence, 
in principle if not in law, of a right to lose citizenship that would become a longstanding 
component of our nation’s general understanding of expatriation and renunciation.   
But, even as these sweeping changes were taking hold in America regarding the 
very nature of citizenship, the government was taking action to restrict who could 
naturalize as a U.S. citizen.  The need for more labor to help build our nation, and the 
promise of possible citizenship and a better life in America, drew more and more 
immigrants and potential immigrants to our shores.  This in turn conflicted with persistent 
racial bias and protectionist concerns regarding the availability of work for 
Americans.  Eventually, sweeping prohibitions on naturalization were enacted, denying 
citizenship to most individuals born in Asia. Those restrictions continued into the middle 
of the 20th century.   
The 20th century saw further growth and development in U.S. law relating to the 
rights of U.S. citizens with regard to their citizenship, and the circumstances under which 
U.S. citizenship might be lost.  Consistent with the law and practice in Europe and 
elsewhere, at the opening of the 20th century U.S. legislators and the judiciary didn’t 
question the ability of the federal government to revoke U.S. citizenship for cause, or to 
pass laws under which some U.S. citizens might find themselves to have lost citizenship 
by operation of law for simply having lived outside of the U.S. too long. As a century 
defined principally by two world wars and their consequences progressed forward, by the 
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middle of the 20th century the fundamental questions regarding acquisition and loss of 
citizenship had been reframed.  The problem of refugees and others displaced by war and 
the redrawing of the world map focused attention away from the ability of nations to 
reject their own citizens, and brought into focus the rights of individuals to obtain and 
retain citizenship, and the basic humanitarian obligations of nations.  The nations of the 
world reacted to this change differently.  In the U.S., the period between the late 1950s 
and 1980, when the Supreme Court decided the last major case regarding loss of 
citizenship, a sea change in the law took place.  Relying heavily on the 14th Amendment, 
the Supreme Court recognized new constitutional protections relating to citizenship 
which prevented the federal government from engaging in punitive or involuntary 
withdrawal of citizenship in virtually all instances.  In the two decades that followed, 
interest in loss of citizenship in the U.S., as measured by legislative and legal challenges, 
diminished.  The 20th century ended with this area of law significantly changed as 
compared to a century earlier.  A U.S. citizen could only lose citizenship by voluntarily 
undertaking a statutory expatriating act with the intention of losing citizenship.   
At the dawn of the 21st century, international terrorism sparked renewed interest 
in loss of citizenship.  Our allies in Europe and elsewhere considered changes to their loss 
of citizenship law in an effort to combat the threat of terror at home and abroad.  This 
thesis reviews the legislative efforts of the U.K., Australia, and France relevant to 
terrorism-related loss of citizenship.  Those efforts are enlightening if not entirely 
instructive.  Both the U.K. and Australia changed their loss of citizenship law in response 
to this new perceived threat.  Fundamental difference between the government of the 
U.K. and America, and the structure of our respective legal codes, meant the U.K.’s 
changes provided little in the way of useful guidance for U.S. legislators.  Australia, on 
the other hand, with its federal system of government, made legislative changes more in 
keeping with U.S. legal traditions, providing some possible guidance for U.S. 
legislators.  In particular, Australia’s incorporation of a statutory presumption regarding 
the intent necessary for loss of citizenship to occur, as well as limitations regarding the 
creation of stateless people and the inability for loss of Australian citizenship to take 
place while a citizen is physically in Australia, are provisions that U.S. legislators might 
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consider.  France, which attempted to expand extant terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
law by constitutional amendment so that it would permit application of the law to 
individuals born French—a change from existing constraints limiting that outcome to 
naturalized citizens—ultimately retreated from that effort.  French civil law is quite 
different from U.S. law, as is the French Constitution.  The lesson from the French effort 
is perhaps limited to a cautionary warning that significant legal changes intended to 
address transitory problems in a manner that that affects the very character of the nation 
are likely best abandoned.   
This thesis then reviews bills submitted to Congress in the U.S. since 9/11 
proposing new terrorism-related loss of citizenship laws.  Those bills are, as a group, 
difficult to characterize as serious efforts at legislation.  While individually they may 
offer potential loss of citizenship solutions ranging from interesting, to misguided, to at 
times fatally flawed, none of these bills sufficiently answers the question, “Why is loss of 
citizenship a necessary or appropriate solution to the problem of terrorism?” Rather, as a 
group they seem intended to answer a different question: “Do you deserve to remain a 
citizen?” In many instances these bills could have been passed into law, in whole or part, 
and administered consistent with the Constitution; however, that fact alone does not make 
them serious legislative efforts.  As a practical matter, key constitutional protections 
limiting loss of citizenship to voluntary acts committed with the intention of losing 
citizenship inform the analysis.  For loss of citizenship to occur based, hypothetically, on 
joining a foreign terrorist organization, the agency administering that law would need to 
determine (a) that the individual joined the foreign terrorist organization voluntarily, and 
(b) that by joining the organization, the citizen intended to lose his U.S. citizenship. 
Absent express evidence of intent, agency administrators would need to rely on facts and 
circumstances from which it would be reasonable to infer intent.  Both the voluntariness 
and intent determinations would be subject to rebuttal. Considering the forgoing, 
effective implementation of terrorism-related loss of citizenship in the U.S. would be 
challenging. A bill might be capable of being implemented within the basic structure and 
limitations imposed under U.S. law, and yet still the beneficial purpose of such a bill may 
remain elusive.  No legislator to date has identified a serious deficit in existing U.S. law 
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that would be remedied through new loss of citizenship law, or demonstrated that loss of 
citizenship, as opposed to some other consequence or mechanism, is the best way to 
address a particular terrorism-related threat to the nation or its people.  
In the final chapter, this thesis provides further analysis and conclusions. It is not 
an unreasonable notion that casting one’s lot with a notorious foreign terrorist 
organization publicly bent on harming our nation and its people might reasonably be 
interpreted to reflect a comprehensive rejection of the United States sufficient to imperil 
one’s citizenship. But legislators to date have failed to connect their legislative offerings 
to the necessary correction of anything other than a defect in loyalty and 
allegiance.  Viewed in this manner, the post-9/11 terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
bills can be seen, in part, as revisiting a critical question.  Is U.S. citizenship a privilege 
that entails a collection of duties and obligations, and that is subject to revocation? Or is 
it a protected legal status that guarantees the holder a collection critically important rights 
and protections, and that cannot be forcibly withdrawn?   
The answer seems clear.  By the end of the 20th century, control over loss of 
citizenship had been wrested from the federal government and invested in the 
citizen.  Citizenship in the U.S. is more akin to a protected legal status.  It cannot be 
forcibly withdrawn.  Viewed in this light, new loss of citizenship legislation directed, 
either expressly or implicitly, at correcting little more than deficits of loyalty and 
allegiance will likely itself be deemed deficient.  This is not to say that defects of loyalty 
and allegiance as expatriating acts are unknown in the history of our nation.  But given 
current protections applicable to citizenship, absent identification of a genuine need for 
loss of citizenship to remedy a genuine weakness or deficiency in our homeland security 
apparatus, new terrorism-related loss of citizenship bills are likely to be little more than 
symbolic gestures.  
To the extent that legislators remain interested in offering new terrorism-related 
loss of citizenship legislation, this thesis offers a variety of drafting suggestions for 
consideration.  They include the recommendation that legislators do a better job defining 
key terms, such as what constitutes a terrorist organization.  Legislators are also advised 
to consider new appropriate limitations, including avoiding the creation of stateless ex-
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citizens at home or abroad, and avoiding the possibility of that loss of citizenship will 
occur while an individual is still in the U.S.  It is also recommends that legislators 
consider incorporating a statutory presumption regarding intent, which may facilitate 
adjudication and review.  Finally, legislators are reminded that the key constitutional 
decisions recognizing modern citizenship protections applicable under law were close 
decisions, and that the opportunity to revisit those decisions may arise as a result of 
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“The only title in our democracy superior to that of President is the title of citizen.” 
—Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
“Perfect freedom is as necessary to the health and vigor of commerce as it is to the health 
and vigor of citizenship.” 
—Patrick Henry 
 
“If you have joined an enemy of the United States in attacking the United States and 
trying to kill Americans, I think you sacrifice your rights of citizenship.” 
—Senator Joseph Lieberman 
 
Since September 11, 2001, members of the Congress of the United States have 
introduced a variety of bills that would permit the withdrawal of citizenship1 from U.S. 
citizens who join, support, or travel to fight with or support foreign terrorist 
organizations. Two such bills are currently pending before the 114th Congress. 
Comparable legislation has been passed, or considered and rejected, by many of our 
closest allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and France.   
                                                 
* This work is a product of the author’s independent research and analysis as part of an academic 
program of study. It does not reflect the analysis, opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services or the Department of Homeland Security. 
1 For purposes of this thesis, the term “citizen” or “citizenship” is used to mean both citizenship and 
nationality. In the law, where reference is made to “loss of nationality” or related concepts, loss would 
divest a citizen of both citizenship and nationality, and as applied to a national would divest the individual 
of nationality. There is no situation related to the loss of citizenship or nationality issues addressed in this 
thesis under which a citizen might lose his or her United States citizenship, but retain his or her United 
States nationality. Under United States law a person who is a citizen is also a national of the United States, 
but there are a small number of individuals who are nationals of the United States but who are not citizens. 
They generally include individuals born in an “outlying possession” of the United States, and their children. 
Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 301, 308, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1408 (1952)(as amended). The phrase 
“outlying possession of the United States” is defined to include American Samoa and the Swains Islands. 
Certain residents of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands may also be nationals but not 
citizens of the United States. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(29)(1952)(as amended). See also, “Citizenship and Nationality,” Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands Law Revision Commission, Article 3, §§ 301–304, accessed September 10, 2016, 
http://www.cnmilaw.org/article3.html. A non-citizen national of the United States is entitled to live and 
work in the United States, and may transmit national status to his or her children. Non-citizen nationals of 
the United States are not presently entitled to vote in federal elections, including presidential elections. 
They are entitled to travel on a special United States passport identifying them as nationals and not citizens.   
 2 
The U.S. Constitution, statutory law, and Supreme Court precedent provide a 
variety of protections to U.S. citizens that may affect, limit, or prevent the Congress from 
imposing loss of citizenship as a consequence for overseas terrorist activities. This thesis 
reviews U.S. law regarding the withdrawal of citizenship from U.S. citizens, foreign 
terrorism-related loss of citizenship laws, and post-9/11 legislative efforts in the United 
States to pass terrorism-related loss of citizenship laws. The goal of this thesis is to 
provide a review of relevant efforts, foreign and domestic, to implement loss of 
citizenship as a tool to address the problem of citizens travelling to join or support 
terrorist organizations. This thesis concludes with a collection of recommendations to 
legislators and leaders regarding the legal, policy, and practical hurdles that may exist 
should Congress continue to pursue terrorism-related loss of citizenship in the United 
States.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Upon submission of this thesis, almost exactly 15 years will have elapsed since 
the 9/11 attacks. During that time, the nature of the terrorist threat, and the understanding 
of that threat have changed. Individuals from nations around the world have left their 
homes in unprecedented numbers and travelled to receive training and to support the 
ongoing combat and terrorist operations of international terrorist organizations. This 
population includes U.S. citizens. In February of 2016 the House of Representatives 
Homeland Security Committee produced a “Terror Threat Snapshot,” which reported that 
approximately 250 Americans have travelled or attempted to travel to Syria to join in that 
conflict.2 
The consequences of U.S. citizens travelling to support the ongoing operation of 
foreign terrorist organizations are manifold. United States citizens travel internationally 
under U.S. passports, which guarantee them the rights and privileges accorded U.S. 
citizens in the context of international travel. As a general matter, international travel is 
                                                 
2 U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Terror Threat Snapshot, February 
2016, accessed September 10, 2016, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Feb-HSC-
Terror-Threat-Snapshot-1.pdf.  
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impossible without a passport. In this way, U.S. citizenship is at least indirectly 
contributing to these individuals’ ability to further the cause of terrorist organizations.3  
Also, terrorist organizations can and do use the U.S. citizenship of their members 
to promote their terrorist brand. In their article Tools and Tradeoffs: Confronting U.S. 
Citizen Terrorist Suspects Abroad, Daniel Byman and Benjamin Wittes noted, “For 
propaganda purposes, they enable [a terrorist organization] to play up its appeal and 
underscore its claim to be a global organization. And the cultural and personal 
connections these Americans have to their home make them more effective propagandists 
and recruiters—and as operators, potentially better able to avoid suspicion.”4  
U.S. law regarding the targeting of U.S. citizens in the context of military actions 
is at best complicated. When citizens are members or leaders in overseas terrorist 
organizations, that fact has the ability to affect mission goals and objectives. In an 
example drawn from one of our closest allies, in 2010 the U.K. stripped British 
citizenship from a collection of individuals involved in overseas terrorism, including 
Bilal al-Berjawai, and Mohamed Sakr, who were later killed by U.S. drone strikes. A link 
between these events was hypothesized: “‘It appears that the process of deprivation of 
citizenship made it easier for the U.S. to then designate Mr. Sakr as an enemy combatant, 
to whom the U.K. owes no responsibility whatsoever,’ Saghir Hussain said. Mr. 
Macdonald added that depriving people of their citizenship ‘means that the British 
government can completely wash their hands if the security services give information to 
the Americans who use their drones to track someone and kill them.’”5  
                                                 
3 The Secretary of State has the authority to revoke an individual’s passport without depriving that 
person of citizenship. See generally Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (“Revocation of a passport 
undeniably curtails travel, but the freedom to travel abroad with a “letter of introduction” in the form of a 
passport issued by the sovereign is subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations; as 
such, it is subject to reasonable governmental regulation.”) But exercising that power deprives a citizen of a 
right he or she otherwise possesses—access to a passport.   
4 Daniel Byman and Benjamin Wittes, “Tools and Tradeoffs: Confronting U.S. Citizen Terrorist 




5 Chris Woods, Alice K. Ross, Oliver Wright, “British Terror Suspects Quietly Stripped of 
Citizenship…Then Killed by Drones,” Independent, February 27, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/uk/crime/british-terror-suspects-quietly-stripped-of-citizenship-then-killed-by-drones-8513858.html. 
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Finally, U.S. citizens have a right to return to the United States. U.S. citizens who 
obtain terrorist indoctrination and training overseas can nevertheless resume residence in 
the U.S. under color of their U.S. citizenship, permitting them to engage more easily in 
terrorist activities, including recruitment, here in the United States. For these and other 
reasons, U.S. and allied legislators have long considered loss of citizenship to be a 
potential tool to address these challenging problems. 
This research is significant because it provides a review of the current state of loss 
of citizenship law in the United States, and reviews the terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship options implemented by our allies. This work will serve to inform legislators 
and leaders in the United States of the legal, policy, and practical benefits and limitations 
that a terrorism-related loss of citizenship solution might provide in the United States. 
Interest in loss of citizenship as a tool to address post-9/11 concerns arising from 
the growth of terrorism reflects a common if not universally held belief that citizenship is 
not an entitlement unfettered by standards, obligations, and limitations. Citizenship is the 
most valuable status our nation can bestow. The collection of rights and benefits 
associated with U.S. citizenship is vast, and the obligations are few. But historically and 
continuing to this day, Congress has established actions that, if committed by a citizen, 
could result in loss of citizenship.   
U.S. citizenship is quite difficult to lose. The federal government cannot 
involuntarily strip citizenship from an individual. Rather citizenship, once obtained, can 
only be lost based on a voluntary act committed with the intention of losing citizenship. 
But Congress is empowered to establish, under law, the list of acts that, if committed 
voluntarily and with the necessary intent, can result in loss of citizenship. Voluntariness 
can be presumed and intent can be inferred.6  The result is that, although punitive or 
involuntary loss of citizenship may be a thing of the past, loss of citizenship remains a 
viable consequence, and voluntariness and intent are not insurmountable hurdles. It must 
certainly be the case that a person’s voluntary actions and reasonably-inferred intent are 
not rendered ineffective by regret, or a post-hoc reimagining of one’s prior actions. If a 
                                                 
6 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).  
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U.S. citizen voluntarily joins the forces of a terrorist organization that has directed its 
members to kill Americans and to oppose America, it is not unreasonable to draw certain 
conclusions from that act.7   
Historically and continuing through to today, voluntarily joining the forces of a 
foreign nation at war with the United States can cost you your citizenship, and that 
consequence has engendered little if any controversy. There is no reasonable argument 
that joining the army of a foreign nation at war with the United States is anything other 
than a quintessential example of rejecting one’s ties to the United States, including the 
ties of citizenship binding an individual to our nation, in favor of furthering the 
belligerent purposes and goals of a foreign power. But the nature of modern warfare has 
changed. International warfare is no longer a tool reserved for the exclusive use of nation 
states. Modern advances in technology and tactics allow non-state actors to exert force 
and engage in conflict on the world stage in a manner previously unknown. And in 
response to the changing face of international conflict, it may be necessary and 
appropriate to overhaul the law to ensure that it can be brought to bear against new 
adversaries. Of course, any legislative changes should be tempered and informed both by 
the reasonable goals associated with loss of citizenship proposals, as well as by existing 
limitations under law.   
Joining a terrorist organization in the 21st century, or choosing to act under the 
direction or for the benefit of a terrorist organization, is an obvious modern analog to 
joining the forces of a nation engaged in hostilities with the United States. But there are 
differences. A terrorist organization is not a state. Examples of terrorist organizations that 
come to mind immediately are Al Qaeda and Daesh (ISIS), but there are many more. For 
many Americans, modern terrorism is largely synonymous with Islamist terrorism; 
however, terrorism has not been exclusively appropriated by Islamists. The U.S. State 
Department’s list of “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” includes 60 different 
groups, some of which have been in existence for more than 50 years and many of which 
                                                 
7 Senator Lieberman has made this point. Kasie Hunt, “Lieberman bill would strip citizenship.”  
 6 
have nothing to do with the modern wave of Islamist terror.8 And those are just the 
officially designated foreign terrorist organizations. Domestic groups have also used and 
will continue to use the tactic of terrorism as a tool to achieve their goals.   
A successful terrorism-related loss of citizenship bill would establish under law 
that joining or supporting a terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the United 
States, or that directs its members to engage in hostilities against U.S. citizens, is 
inconsistent with maintaining U.S. citizenship, much in the same way that joining the 
armed forces of a foreign state at war with the United States can cost an individual his or 
her citizenship. But the devil, as always, is in the details. At a bare minimum, a 
successful bill should be drafted with an understanding of existing statutory and other 
legal limitations affecting loss of citizenship. A successful bill must be carefully 
considered and worded to avoid unintended consequences that could adversely affect 
homeland security, or that endanger fundamental rights or protections under U.S. law. It 
is an extreme consequence that must be brought to bear judiciously. However, it may be 
an appropriate consequence in some circumstances, and should not be discounted merely 
because it is extreme.   
This thesis is fundamentally a policy analysis. As such, it does not affirmatively 
argue in favor of a particular outcome. This research demonstrates that a terrorism-related 
loss of citizenship provision in the United States could pass constitutional muster, but 
will require more thoughtful and detailed drafting than bills to date have demonstrated. 
This research also identifies problems related to the use of loss of citizenship as a 
consequence for overseas terrorist activity, the implications of which may not be entirely 
predictable.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Citizenship describes the relationship between an individual and the sovereign 
nation (or nations) to which she is deemed to hold allegiance. It is a relationship 
characterized by mutual obligation as between citizen and nation, encompassing all of the 
                                                 
8 For Example ETA, the Basque separatist group, has roots in the Basque Nationalist Party which 
dates back to the end of the 19th century. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “ETA,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, accessed September 10, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ETA.   
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obligations, rights, privileges, and immunities attendant to citizenship.9 Hannah Arendt 
described citizenship as the “right to have rights.”10  Citizenship is essential to an 
individual’s right to live and work under the protection of and according to the laws of a 
nation without fear of being forcibly removed.11  The United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights holds that “nationality is a fundamental human right.”12 
The indispensable nature of citizenship to an individual’s place in modern society is 
evidenced by the conditions and consequences of statelessness. 
In 1961, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness in an effort to address the growing international problem of statelessness.13  
It is difficult or impossible for a stateless person to travel, reside, or work lawfully in any 
nation, and in many instances to ensure that his or her children acquire a nationality. 
Although United States citizenship can be acquired simply by being born in the United 
States, that is not the case throughout the world. Many children are born into statelessness 
and face significant hurdles acquiring an education, and other basic human rights.14  The 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of rights and responsibilities attended to United States citizenship see generally, 
“Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, accessed September 
10, 2016 https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and-responsibilities; see also, 
Theodore Roosevelt, “The Duties of American Citizenship,” January 26, 1883, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/primary-resources/tr-citizen/. 
10 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: Meridian Books-The World Publishing 
Company, 1962), 296–97.  
11 A non-citizen in the United States may live and work here with permission, and under a variety of 
restrictions. Violation of law may result, in addition to appropriate criminal penalties, in that person’s 
involuntary removal from the United States. A citizen may commit a crime, pay the consequences, and 
return to normal life in the United States.  
12 “Right to a Nationality and Statelessness,” OHCHR, accessed September 10, 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/Nationality.aspx.  
13 “1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
protection/statelessness/3bbb286d8/convention-reduction-statelessness.html. It was ratified and or 
otherwise entered into force by, inter alia, the United Kingdom (1966) and Australia (1973).   France 
signed the convention in 1962, but it never ratified the convention. The United States was involved in the 
drafting of the document, but neither signed nor otherwise joined or acceded to the 1961 Convention.  
“Status of Treaties – Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” United Nations, accessed September 
10, 2016, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= V-
4&chapter=5&clang=_en.  
14 Michael Pizzi, “A stateless child is born every 10 minutes, UN refugee agency says,” Al Jazeera 
America, November 3, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/3/unhcr-stateless-child-born-
every-10-minutes.html. 
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deplorable consequences of statelessness are far reaching, which serves to underline the 
importance of citizenship.15   
In the United States, loss of citizenship for reasons other than fraud or illegality 
associated with naturalization or the acquisition of documents evidencing U.S. 
citizenship16 occurs pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
§ 349). The law governing loss of citizenship is statutory, originating from Congress, but 
as modified or constrained by binding court precedent. In particular, the Supreme Court 
has recognized constitutional protections against the involuntary withdrawal of United 
States citizenship. The last major overhaul of U.S. immigration law, under which loss of 
citizenship provisions are organized, occurred with the passage of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952. In 1952 Congress included in the INA ten actions that could 
cause loss of citizenship.17  Resulting from subsequent litigation, binding precedent, and 
                                                 
15 “Impact of Statelessness,” Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, accessed September 10, 2016, 
http://www.institutesi.org/world/impact.php.  
16 An individual who naturalized, but who during the naturalization process failed to disclose facts or 
circumstances that would have rendered her or him ineligible to naturalize (i.e., prior disqualifying criminal 
activities), may be stripped of citizenship by revocation. Immigration and Nationality Act § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 
1451 (1952)(as amended). Another means by which individuals unlawfully acquire citizenship is by 
unlawful acquisition of a Certificate of Citizenship or Certificate of Naturalization. A Certificate of 
Citizenship is lawfully obtained by individuals who are able to document that they already acquired U.S. 
citizenship (for example, individuals born outside of the United States to a U.S. citizen under circumstances 
that convey U.S. citizenship.)  A Certificate of Naturalization is lawfully obtained through the 
naturalization process. An unlawfully acquired Certificate of Citizenship or Certificate of Naturalization 
can be cancelled. Immigration and Nationality Act § 342, 8 U.S.C. § 1453 (1952)(as amended). A U.S. 
passport is also indicia of U.S. citizenship. The Department of State, which is the issuing authority for U.S. 
passports, has the authority to revoke an improperly issued passport.  22 U.S.C. § 211a. See also 22 C.F.R., 
§ 51.60-62.  
17 The original 1952 loss of nationality provisions are here summarized: (1) obtaining naturalization in 
a foreign state; (2) taking an oath or making a declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; (3) entering the 
armed forces of a foreign state; (4) accepting a significant position in the government of a foreign state; (5) 
voting in a political election of a foreign state; (6) renouncing citizenship overseas before a U.S. consular 
officer; (7) renouncing citizenship in the U.S. while the U.S. is in a state of war and subject to other 
limitations; (8) deserting the U.S. military in a time of war; (9) committing any act of treason upon 
conviction by a court martial or other court of competent jurisdiction; and (10) departing from or remaining 
outside of the U.S. during a time of war. An Act to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, 
Naturalization, and Nationality; and for Other Purposes, Public Law 82–414, 66 Stat. 267 (1952), also 
known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 
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legislative amendment, only seven remain, and the predicate conditions under which loss 
of citizenship can take place in the United States have also changed.18   
Today, loss of U.S. citizenship can only take place if a statutory expatriating act is 
committed voluntarily and with the specific intention of losing citizenship.19  Under 
current law, the voluntariness prong is presumed, which means that simply committing 
one of the enumerated acts raises the presumption that it was committed voluntarily, 
subject to rebuttal. No such statutory presumption exists under law regarding the specific 
intention required. Intent can therefore be a more challenging part of the analysis when 
considering a loss of citizenship case.   
A key constitutional protection related to citizenship is found in the 14th 
Amendment, which states in pertinent part, “All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the 
State wherein they reside.”  In 1967, a sharply divided (5-4) Supreme Court held that the 
14th Amendment “withdrew from the government of the United States the power to 
expatriate United States citizens against their will for any reason.”20Although this 
language seems definitive, United States citizens continued to lose citizenship for a 
variety of reasons as the courts and the federal government came to understand how the 
law operated under this new restriction.21   
                                                 
18 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C., § 1481 (1952)(as amended). Current loss of 
nationality provisions are here summarized: (1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state; (2) taking an 
oath of allegiance to a foreign state ; (3) entering or serving as a commissioned or non-commissioned 
officer in the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in hostilities against the United States; (4) serving in a 
position in a foreign government where such positions requires naturalization or an oath of allegiance; (5) 
renouncing citizenship overseas before a U.S. consular officer; (6) renouncing citizenship in the U.S. while 
the U.S. is in a state of war and subject to other limitations; (7) treason or related crimes when convicted by 
a court martial or other court of competent jurisdiction. 
19 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952)(as amended); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 
U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980). 
20 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).  
21 Loss of U.S. citizenship has been determined and upheld, over the objection of the individual, and 
despite court challenge, in a variety of cases decided after 1967’s Afroyim v. Rusk. See e.g., King v. Rogers, 
463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972)(U.S. citizen who naturalized as a British citizen, and later an Israeli citizen 
was deemed to have lost of U.S. citizenship); Davis v. District Director, Immigration & Naturalization 
Service, 481 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1979)(“World Citizen” and U.S. World War II veteran Gary Davis was 
deemed to have loss his citizenship through his own voluntary renunciation); U.S. v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 
1166 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(U.S. born individual who returned to a German enclave in Romania as a boy and 
served as a concentration camp guard in Nazi Germany deemed to have lost his U.S. citizenship). 
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Shortly thereafter, another similarly divided Court reached a potentially 
conflicting decision, concluding that some citizens who acquire citizenship through 
statutory naturalization provisions fall outside of the scope of 14th Amendment.22  The 
case, Rogers v. Bellei, did not involve application of the loss of nationality provisions of 
the INA at section 349, but rather involved section 301 of the INA, the statutory section 
that determines whether and under what circumstances an individual acquires citizenship 
at birth.23  As originally enacted, INA § 301 imposed certain residency requirements on 
individuals born outside of the United States to a U.S. citizen parent and a non-citizen 
parent.24 The Rogers v. Bellei court held that certain statutory citizenship laws, such as 
the one at issue before the court, fall outside of the scope of the 14th Amendment, which 
only applies to individuals born or naturalized in the United States.  
Ultimately, Rogers v. Bellei didn’t signal a significant Supreme Court 
retrenchment. While it may be possible under existing Supreme Court precedent to 
subject U.S. citizens who acquire citizenship in a manner other than having been “born or 
naturalized in the United States” to reasonable additional conditions for purpose of 
acquiring citizenship, Rogers v. Bellei does not stand for the proposition that once 
citizenship is in fact acquired, it would be constitutional to treat some citizens differently 
than others for purposes of expatriation, or for any other purpose. As such, Rogers v. 
Bellei has not played a significant role in the development of loss of citizenship law. 
Under current Supreme Court precedent, Congress cannot strip citizenship 
involuntarily from United States citizens; however, the relevant Supreme Court decisions 
constraining Congress in this regard were not the product of unanimous courts or even 
                                                 
22 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. See also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971). Between 1967 when 
Afroyim v. Rusk was decided and 1971 when Rogers v. Bellei was decided, the composition of the court 
changed. Two members of the Afroyim majority (Earl Warren and Abe Fortas) and one the dissenters (Tom 
Clark) were replaced by three new justices (Harry Blackman, Warren Burger, and Thurgood Marshall). In 
1971, the remaining Afroyim dissenters (John Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron White) were joined by two 
of their new colleagues (Harry Blackmun and Warren Burger) to form the majority in Rogers v. Bellei. 
Harry Blackmun, the most junior member of the court at that time, wrote the majority decision in Rogers v. 
Bellei. The remaining members of the Afroym majority (Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and William 
Brennan) along with another new colleagues (Thurgood Marshall) were now dissenters. 
23 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).  
24 Immigration and Nationality Act § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952)(as amended).  
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strong majorities, suggesting that changes to the ideological make-up of the Supreme 
Court could have an outcome determinative effect should this issue come before the court 
again. In 1967, Justice Harlan’s dissent (joined by justices White, Clark, and Stewart) in 
Afroyim v. Rusk began by noting, “The Court today overrules [prior precedent], and 
declares [a loss of citizenship provision] unconstitutional, by a remarkable process of 
circumlocution. First, the Court fails almost entirely to dispute the reasoning in [the prior 
case]; it is essentially content with the conclusory and quite unsubstantiated assertion that 
Congress is without ‘any general power, express or implied,’ to expatriate a citizen 
‘without his assent.’”25  The dissent then went on at length to note Congress’ long history 
of passing loss of nationality laws that resulted in involuntary withdrawal of citizenship 
under some circumstances, and prior Supreme Courts’ approval of those laws.   
Justice Harlan’s dissent concludes by arguing, not without some force, that the 
14th Amendment served the laudable functions of overruling the repugnant Dred Scott 
decision, and declaring, “to whom citizenship initially attaches.”26  It did not, according 
to the dissent, serve to entirely withdraw from Congress the authority to strip citizenship. 
The closeness of these decisions leaves open the possibility that the Court could revisit 
the government’s power to expatriate U.S. citizens against their will. A new terrorism-
related expatriation provision could provide a strong vehicle to challenge this precedent. 
In addition, the creation of new statutory presumptions that allow courts to find voluntary 
relinquishment as a result of intent inferred from the act of travelling to join or support a 
foreign terrorist organization may allow loss to take place consistent with existing 
constitutional and statutory protections. 
Loss of citizenship is an issue that arises in other contexts as well. In the context 
of criminal litigation, some federal prosecutors have utilized loss of citizenship as a 
bargaining chip, negotiating and obtaining agreements from defendants to leave the 
                                                 
25 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 269 (1967). 
26 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 292 (1967). Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) was the 
Supreme Court decision which held that individuals brought to the United States from Africa as slaves, 
even if later released from slavery, could not be or become American citizens and had no standing to bring 
suit in U.S. federal courts. 
 12 
United States and voluntarily renounce their citizenship overseas.27  Some commentators 
have also argued that punitive use of loss of citizenship has survived.28   
Some review of post-9/11 loss-of-citizenship bills has also taken place. At least 
one commentator, Ben Herzog, as part of an extensive review of the history of 
expatriation in the United States, reviewed both a draft version of the Patriot Act II that 
was never submitted to Congress, as well as legislation submitted by Senator Joseph 
Lieberman proposing to amend the INA to add a terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
provision. Herzog concluded that the lack of general support for these measures may 
indicate that “the ideas expressed by the Supreme Court since 1958 have permeated 
Congress,” but have not necessarily been universally accepted.29 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research examines the nature of U.S. citizenship and the associated 
legislative and constitutional protections that have developed to inform loss of 
citizenship. It then examines terrorism-related expatriation laws that have been adopted 
or considered and rejected by the United Kingdom, Australia, and France. It then reviews 
the various terrorism-related expatriation bills have that have been introduced in 
Congress since 9/11, concluding with bills currently pending before Congress.   
Based on this research, this thesis assesses the viability of loss of citizenship 
solutions to the problem of U.S. citizens travelling to join or support foreign terrorist 
organizations, as well as problems or deficiencies in previously-proposed and existing 
legislative options. Finally, this thesis offers a collection of recommendations regarding 
matters that should be included or considered in any future loss of citizenship laws 
proposed or considered by legislators. 
                                                 
27 See e.g., Abigail D. Lauer, “The Easy Way Out: The Yaser Hamdi Release Agreement and The 
United States Treatment of the Citizen Enemy Combatant Dilemma,” Cornell Law Review 91, no. 4 (2006): 
927–956, accessed September 10, 2016, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
3031&context=clr.  
28 For example, Ben Herzog has argued that the use of denaturalization proceedings may in some 
instances constitute a punitive use of loss of nationality. Ben Herzog, Revoking Citizenship: Expatriation in 
America from the Colonial Era to the War on Terror (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 
chapter 8.   
29 Ibid.   
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II. ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
UNITED STATES — A SURVEY OF THE BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides a survey of the historical growth and development of 
United States law relevant to expatriation and loss of citizenship. Although this review 
will touch on some aspects of the historical growth and development of U.S. law 
regarding citizenship and naturalization, the breadth and scope of this review is by no 
means exhaustive, particularly with respect to naturalization. The evolution of U.S. law 
pertaining to loss of citizenship is inexorably tied to early efforts to clarify and define 
when and under which circumstances an individual might acquire U.S. citizenship. For 
this reason, the following review may stray down a legal side road from time to time in 
the interest of establishing a sufficiently detailed picture of the general topic for the 
reader. This chapter ends with a short discussion of relevant international law, reviewing 
three key sources from the post-World War II era that may affect loss of citizenship 
decisions. 
A. CITIZENSHIP AT THE BIRTH OF AMERICA 
The United States Constitution contains no express language concerning loss of 
citizenship.  The Constitution references related issues in two places.  First, Article I, 
Section 8, states that Congress shall have the power to “establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization.” Then, Section 1 of the 14th Amendment states, “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside.”  The amendment goes on to limit the 
ability of the states to “make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”30   
Although the United States Constitution lacks any express reference to 
expatriation or loss of citizenship, acquiring and losing citizenship were important issues 
beginning in the infancy of the United States.  Early U.S. law reflected the importance of 
acquiring new citizens. In 1790 Congress adopted the first legislation regarding 
                                                 
30 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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naturalization, titled An Act to Establish An Uniform Rule of Naturalization.31 The 1790 
Act provided that any free white alien who had resided in the United States for two years 
or more could apply to be a citizen.32  
Great Britain historically asserted that British subjects held perpetual allegiance to 
Great Britain unless and until released from that obligation by the King.33  Obviously, the 
United States challenged this allegiance during the American Revolution.  The Treaty of 
Paris, by which the United States and Great Britain ended the Revolutionary War, 
implicitly acknowledged the existence of the people of the United States at that 
time…i.e., former citizens/subjects of Great Britain, and is generally held to have served 
the purpose of releasing prior British subjects (who became Americans after the war) 
from their obligations to the crown.  It did not, however, touch on the question of future 
naturalization of British subjects or the reciprocal possibility that citizens of the newly 
created United States might return to Great Britain.  Great Britain’s continued reliance on 
the notion of perpetual allegiance quickly became evident.   
When Great Britain went to war with France in 1803 (the Napoleonic Wars), 
British warships began intercepting American ships on the high seas and impressing into 
British service individuals found on board who may have had some prior connection with 
                                                 
31 An Act to Establish An Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
32 Periodic revisions of this law took place subsequently, including in 1795, 1798, and 1802. An Act to 
Establish An Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Passed on that Subject, 1 
Stat. 414 (1795); An Act Supplementary to and to Amend the Act, Instituted “An Act to Establish An 
Uniform Rule of Naturalization;” and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Passed on that Subject, 1 Stat. 566 
(1798); An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, and to Repeal the Acts Heretofore Passed 
on that Subject, 2 Stat. 153 (1802).    
33 “Great Britain long adhered to the rule of perpetual allegiance, and her impressment upon the high 
seas of naturalized American citizens of British birth was the chief cause of the war of 1812.” George F. 
Tucker, “Naturalization,” in Modern American Law: A Systematic and Comprehensive Commentary on the 
Fundamental Principles of American Law and Procedure, Accompanied by Leading Illustrative Cases and 
Legal Forms (Chicago: Blackstone Institute, 1911), Vol. 11, Part VI, 447–451, https://books.google.com/ 
books/download/
Modern_American_Law.pdf?id=AW4aAAAAYAAJ&output=pdf&sig=ACfU3U04PNHjPL8wB2D4GuF4
K7G5AjuwKQ.   For a thorough review of the law relating to acquisition and loss of nationality as viewed 
from a late 19th century lens, see also U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
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Great Britain.34  This practice formed a significant cause of the War of 1812 between 
England and the United States.35  
B. THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Problems related to allegiance and nationality continued through and beyond the 
U.S. Civil War, when conflict again arose between the United States and Great Britain 
regarding the effect and consequences of U.S. naturalization on former British 
subjects.  American citizens, some naturalized and some native, travelled to Ireland and 
England to participate in the Fenian movement for Irish independence in the 
1860s.  Some were captured and tried amid questions about their nationality. These 
questions were of importance, as the answers determined whether participating in the 
Fenian movement constituted treason, as well as the protections under British law to 
which individuals were entitled during prosecution for alleged crimes. Procedures 
differed depending on whether the defendant was a British subject or a foreign 
national.36 For example, in the case of John McCafferty, a U.S. citizen and Civil War 
veteran who was tried in Ireland for treason after having been apprehended in Cork in 
possession of Fenian literature, the fact that he was determined to be an alien and not a 
native Irishman entitled him to a trial with a jury composed half of aliens.37  These cases 
raised concern in the United States about the rights of individuals and the arguments the 
U.S. government was making or wanted to make forcefully in foreign courts, such as 
those of Great Britain, that upon naturalization in the U.S. allegiance to one’s birth 
nation, and all duties and obligations appertaining there to, were severed.  In addition, 
even as the federal government was taking assertive steps to protect the rights of recently 
naturalized Americans born in Europe, and despite the fact that African slaves were 
                                                 
34 “Napoleonic Wars and the United States, 1803-1815,” U.S. Department of State Office of the 
Historian, accessed September 10, 2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/napoleonic-wars.  
35 “Great Britain long adhered to the rule of perpetual allegiance, and her impressment upon the high 
seas of naturalized American citizens of British birth was the chief cause of the war of 1812.” George F. 
Tucker, “Naturalization.” 
36 Niamh Howlin, “Fenians, Foreigners and Jury Trials in Ireland, 1865-1870,” Irish Jurist 45 (2010): 
51–81.  
37 The Jury in the McCafferty case was composed of 6 Irishmen, 4 Frenchmen, and 1 each from 
Switzerland and Italy. Ibid. 
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finally provided an opportunity to become citizens, the Congress was taking steps to 
further entrench and expand racially-based restrictions on naturalization.   
1. The Expatriation Act of 1868 
The year 1868 was an important year for matters pertaining to loss and acquisition 
of U.S. citizenship, as it saw the enactment of the Expatriation Act of 1868, as well as the 
establishment of early treaties reflecting agreements with foreign nations regarding our 
mutual understanding of the effects and consequences to aliens of naturalization as a U.S. 
citizen. The principle—founded on conceptions of natural law and the natural rights of 
man—that an individual could throw off allegiance to one sovereign and acquire 
allegiance to another, was first announced in our federal law in the preamble of the 
Expatriation Act of 1868: “Whereas, the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent 
right of all people…”38  The Act asserted that the right of expatriation is a fundamental 
principle of our government.  It said, “…all naturalized citizens of the United States, 
while in foreign states, shall be entitled to, and shall receive from this government, the 
same protection of persons and property that is accorded to native-born citizens in like 
situations and circumstances.”39  
The purpose of the 1868 Act was to declare publically that the force and authority 
of the federal government was behind U.S. citizens, including naturalized citizens, 
travelling abroad. It was an act supporting the right of foreign citizens to divest 
themselves of their original citizenship in favor of acquiring U.S. citizenship. As Daniel 
Klubock noted in his article, Expatriation — Its Origin and Meaning, “[t]his Act was 
directed at other countries, and served notice that the United States would extend its 
protection to all citizens, naturalized as well as native-born. There was no question that 
expatriation here meant the transfer of citizenship from a foreign country to the United 
States.”40 The Act itself did not articulate any grounds, process, procedure, or acts by 
                                                 
38 An Act Concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign States, 15 Stat. 223 (1868), 
commonly known as the Expatriation Act of 1868.   
39 Ibid.   
40 Daniel Klubock, “Expatriation — Its Origin and Meaning,” Notre Dame Law Review 38 (1962): 1–
49, accessed September 10, 2016, http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
3425&context=ndlr.  
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which U.S. citizens could divest themselves of U.S. citizenship, or indeed acquire U.S. 
citizenship. Rather, it put foreign governments on notice that the United States intended 
to defend the rights of all of its citizens, and authorized the President to take appropriate 
action to obtain the release of United States citizens unjustly held overseas, excepting 
only that the President could not take actions amounting to acts of war. Also notable, the 
Act was passed into law on July 27, 1868, just more than two weeks after the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted (July 9, 1868).  
2. The Burlingame and Bancroft Treaties 
Between 1868 and 1907 there was no federal law expressly enumerating the 
circumstances under which a U.S. citizen would lose his or her U.S. citizenship, 
excepting the Enrollment Act of 1865, a Civil War-era law which provided for loss of 
citizenship under some circumstances upon desertion from the armed forces.41  It fell to 
the Department of State to address and resolve most loss of citizenship issues, which 
efforts are reflected largely in treaties such as the Burlingame Treaty, and the Bancroft 
series of treaties.  
The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 was a treaty between the United States and China. 
It stated under Article V, “The United States of America and the Emperor of China 
cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and 
allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their 
citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to the other, for purposes of 
curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.”42 Although the language of this treaty 
encompasses matters of migration and emigration, concerns related to Chinese laborers in 
the United States would soon lead Congress to exclude the Chinese from eligibility to 
naturalize as U.S. citizens.   
                                                 
41 An Act to Amend the Several Acts Heretofore Passed to Provide For the Enrolling and Calling Out 
the National Forces, and for Other Purposes, 13 Stat. 487 (1865), § 21, commonly known as the 
Enrollment Act of 1865, http://legisworks.org/sal/13/stats/STATUTE-13-Pg487.pdf. 
42 Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868, U.S. Department of State, accessed September 10, 2016,   
http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb4m3nb03h/?order=2&brand=calisphere. For more on the Burlingame 
Treaty, see “The Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 
accessed September 10, 2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty.  
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The Bancroft series of treaties, which also addressed matters related to 
naturalization and loss of citizenship, were entered into between the United States and a 
variety of other nations, beginning with Prussia in 1868.43  Other signatories included 
Albania, Austria-Hungary, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Haiti, Hesse, Honduras, Lithuania, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Wurttemberg.  These 
treaties persisted for a long time, with the last terminating in the late 20th century.44  
3. The Expatriation Act of 1907 
The Expatriation Act of 1907 articulated for the first time a collection of acts that, 
by statute, would result in a United States citizen losing his or her citizenship.45  Loss of 
citizenship under the 1907 Act could occur for a variety of reasons including taking an 
oath of allegiance to a foreign state, and for women, marrying a foreign citizen. In 
addition, the 1907 Act addressed some issues related to the citizenship status of children 
born abroad of alien parents who later naturalize, and regarding children born abroad of 
U.S. citizen parents.46  Portions of the 1907 Act were repealed by the Cable Act of 1922, 
also known as the Married Women’s Independent Nationality Act, and which provided 
that if a woman married a foreigner who was eligible to naturalize as a U.S. citizen, she 
would not lose her U.S. citizenship.47  
4. Racial Bars to Naturalization 
The longstanding rule dating back to 1790 that naturalization was limited to white 
aliens was disrupted following the conclusion of the Civil War, when, pursuant to the 
                                                 
43 Charles Munde, The Bancroft Naturalization Treaties with the German States; the United States’ 
Constitution and the Rights and Privileges of Citizens of Foreign Birth (Wurtzburg, 1868), accessed 
September 10, 2016, https://archive.org/stream/cu31924005227503#page/n3/mode/2up.  
44 7 U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual § 1270, appendix A (2013), 
https://fam.state.gov/fam/07fam/07fam1200apA.html. 
45 An Act In Reference to the Expatriation of Citizens and their Protection Abroad, 34 Stat. 1228 
(1907), commonly known as the Expatriation Act of 1907.    
46 Ibid. 
47 An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women, 42 Stat. 1021 (1922), 
commonly known as the Cable Act of 1922 or the Married Women’s Independent Nationality Act. 
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Naturalization Act of 1870, individuals having African heritage were permitted to 
naturalize as citizens.48  The changes resulting from the Naturalization Act of 1870 did 
not extend to other ethnicities. Ethnicity-based bars to naturalization persisted. For 
example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 prevented Chinese laborers brought to the 
United States from becoming citizens.49  Litigation related to this controversial 
legislation helped to further develop the law regarding acquisition and loss of citizenship 
and the scope of constitutional protections.   
In 1898 the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark overturned part of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act amid a challenge by a man who was born in the United States to 
Chinese laborers.50  The Supreme Court did not disturb or challenge the ability of 
Congress to legislate a uniform rule of naturalization, which at that time included 
ethnicity-based restrictions, but it did conclude that the 14th Amendment guaranteed 
citizenship to individuals born in the United States, even individuals born to Chinese 
parents who were not eligible to naturalize. Still, ethnicity-based naturalization 
prohibitions under U.S. law continued to expand. The Chinese Exclusions Act was 
reenacted and extended in 1902 and again in 1904.51  Later the Immigration Acts of 1917 
and 1924 established the “Asiatic Barred Zone,” restricting immigration from most of 
Asia, including Turkey, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, 
                                                 
48 An Act to Amend the Naturalization Laws and to Punish Crime Against the Same, and for Other 
Purposes, 16 Stat. 254 (1870).  
49 An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), commonly 
known as the Chinese Exclusion Act.  
50 U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). The decision in this case, and the extensive dissent, 
provide an excellent historical review of the law affecting acquisition and loss of citizenship in the 19th 
century and earlier. 
51 An Act to Prohibit the Coming Into and to Regulate the Residence Within the United States, its 
Territories, and All Territory Under its Jurisdiction, and the District of Columbia, of Chinese and Persons 
of Chinese Descent, 32 Stat. 176 (1902).   
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Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Pacific islands with 
the exception of the Philippines.52   
The Chinese Exclusion Act was formally repealed in 1943 by the Magnuson 
Act.53  The Luce-Cellar Act of 1946 further eroded the restrictions against immigration 
from Asia.  Ultimately, racial exclusions were eliminated with the passage of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 
C. THE NATIONALITY ACT OF 1940 
The Nationality Act of 1940 was the next major event reflecting significant 
growth and change in the law affecting acquisition and loss of citizenship.54  The loss of 
citizenship provisions in the 1940 Act, which resemble current law in many respects, 
were organized under Chapter IV of the Act, §§ 401–410. Pursuant to the 1940 Act, loss 
of citizenship could take place under a variety of circumstances, including naturalizing in 
a foreign nation, taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign nation, serving in the armed 
forces of a foreign nation, serving in a position in a foreign government for which only 
nationals are eligible, voting in a foreign election, making a formal renunciation before a 
diplomatic or consular officer, deserting the armed forces in time of war (requires 
conviction by court martial), and treason (requires conviction by court martial or a court 
of competent jurisdiction).55  
The 1940 Act also created a presumption of loss of citizenship when a U.S. 
citizen born in the United States or outside the United Sates of citizen parents resided for 
six months or more in a foreign country in which his/her parents had naturalized.  In 
                                                 
52 An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the United States, 
39 Stat. 874 (1917), commonly known as the Immigration Act of 1917. See also, An Act to Limit 
Immigration of Aliens Into the United States, and for Other Purposes, 43 Stat. 153 (1924), commonly 
known as the Immigration Act of 1924. For further information regarding the United States’ troubling 
historic discrimination against Asians, see “Closed Borders and Mass Deportations: The Lessons of the 
Barred Zone Act,” American Immigration Council, January 1, 2005.   
53 An Act to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, to Establish Quotas, and for Other Purposes, 57 Stat. 
600 (1943).  
54 An Act to Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States into a Comprehensive 
Nationality Code, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), commonly known as the Nationality Act of 1940.  
55 Ibid.  
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addition, it created a complicated system providing for loss of citizenship for naturalized 
citizens depending upon the duration of an individual’s residence outside the United 
States, and in some instance whether the person resided outside of the United States in 
the land of his or her birth.  In all instances, a naturalized U.S. citizen who resided for 
five continuous years outside the U.S. (other than while working for the U.S. government 
or under other limited enumerated circumstances) would lose his or her U.S. 
citizenship.56  
D. THE 1944 RENUNCIATION ACT — A CAUTIONARY TALE 
Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the government of the United States took 
action to address security concerns. The potential threat of aliens in the United States 
loyal to the Axis powers demanded action. Under authority conferred by Chapter 3, Title 
50 of the United States Code regarding “Alien Enemies”57 and by presidential 
proclamations on December 7 and 8 of 1941, citizens of Germany, Italy, and Japan who 
were present in the United States were made subject to detention and removal.58 Another 
perceived threat was the potential for espionage and sabotage. President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 9066 to address those problems. Executive Order 9066 authorized the 
Secretary of War to designate protected military areas in the United States, and to 
exclude from those areas “any or all persons.”59  This order was applied to exclude from 
the west coast of the United States approximately 120,000 United States citizens and 
lawful residents, primarily individuals having Japanese heritage, but also including a 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (1940), accessed September 10, 2016, http://loc.heinonline.org/loc/
Page?handle=hein.uscode/usc1940003&id=1419&collection=journals&index=uscode/uscc#1420.  
58 U.S. President, Proclamation, “Alien Enemies—Japanese, No. 2525,” December 7, 1941, accessed 
September 10, 2016, http://www.foitimes.com/internment/Proc2525.html; U.S. President, Proclamation, 
“Alien Enemies—German, No. 2526,” December 8, 1941, accessed September 10, 2016, 
http://www.foitimes.com/internment/Proc2526.html; U.S. President, Proclamation, “Alien Enemies—
Italians, No. 2527,” December 8, 1941, accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.foitimes.com/internment/
Proc2527.html.  
59 Exec. Order 9,066 of February 19, 1942, Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military 
Areas, accessed September 10, 2016, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=74&page=transcript.  
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smaller number of individuals having German and Italian heritage.60 The bulk of these 
individuals were relocated and compulsorily interned in camps located in remote regions 
of California, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, Colorado, and Arkansas.61  It took 
Congress 46 years to acknowledge that these actions constituted “a grave injustice …to 
both citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry…”62   
The Attorney General was aware of the potential constitutional infirmity of the 
ongoing internment of Japanese-Americans, a process by which, “American citizens, not 
charged with crime and not under martial law could be detained by administrative, 
military or civil officials or upon a mere administrative determination of loyalty.”63  
Congress requested that the Attorney General identify an alternate process by which 
individuals “could be detained as alien enemies without doing violence to our traditional 
constitutional safeguards.”64  Congress quickly considered and enacted a renunciation of 
citizenship law intended to resolve that problem.65   
Taking advantage of the evident unrest and coercive conditions associated with 
internment, U.S. authorities planned to offer individuals suspected of disloyalty the 
opportunity to renounce their U.S. citizenship. In doing so, it was believed two benefits 
would obtain. First, administrative suspicions regarding loyalty would be confirmed, as a 
loyal U.S. citizen would never renounce his or her citizenship. Second, upon renouncing 
                                                 
60 “Teaching With Documents: Documents and Photographs Related to Japanese Relocation During 
World War II National Archives,” National Archives, accessed September 10, 2016, 
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation/#documents; and “Brief Overview of the 
World War II Enemy Alien Control Program,” National Archives, accessed September 10, 2016, 
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62 An Act to implement recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
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63 Abo v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 806, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1948).  
64 Ibid. 
65 An Act to Provide for Loss of United States Nationality Under Certain Circumstances, Public Law 
78–405, 58 Stat. 677 (1944), commonly known as the Renunciation Act of 1944, accessed September 10, 
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citizenship, the individual would be subject to lawful detention pursuant to the Enemy 
Aliens Act. Regulations were subsequently promulgated at 8 C.F.R. part 316, and 
consisting of §§ 316.1-316.9.66   
Although the 1944 regulations terminated at the close of World War II,67 the 
statutory renunciation provision at 8 U.S.C. § 801(i) remained in the 1946 version of the 
U.S. Code, and was included, without apparent debate or discussion, in the 1952 
enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act, where it can currently be found today 
at INA § 349(a)(6).68   
World War II renunciations under these conditions were later deemed coercive, 
hearings and procedures failed to meet minimum due process requirements, and 
individuals who renounced under this provision but regretted it were permitted to recover 
their United States citizenship.69 The 1944 Renunciation Act serves as a cautionary 
reminder of how legislation directed at facilitating the withdrawal of citizenship from a 
targeted group based on perceived national or homeland security interests can fail in a 
number of different ways. 
E. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952 
The last major overhaul of the United States immigration system occurred with 
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which brought the basic 
structure of expatriation and renunciation forward to the present.  Prior to and during 
                                                 
66 Renunciation of United States Nationality, 9 Fed. Reg. 12241 (October 7, 1944), 8 C.F.R. § 316.1-
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World War II, unfounded fears of a fifth column70 within the United States comprised of 
U.S. citizens of having Japanese ancestry who were loyal or sympathetic to Japan, 
infused U.S. leaders with a sense of nationality and loyalty fueled in part by racial and 
ethnic prejudice.71  Some of that prejudice had previously been incorporated into U.S. 
law, as evidenced by the 1917 Act, the 1924 Act, and the creation of the Asiatic Barred 
Zone. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 Act began to undo some of those 
legal changes, perhaps reflecting a fledgling civil rights movement in the United States 
and decolonization around the world.  
Since its enactment, a collection of constitutional challenges related to the 
expatriation provisions under the INA have been considered by the Supreme Court, 
further reshaping the statute and establishing additional protections associated with 
citizenship. 
In Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) the Supreme Court found that the 
legislature’s authority to pass laws regarding loss of citizenship was inherent in the power 
to conduct foreign affairs under the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution 
(Article I, Section 8, clause 18).  In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) the Supreme 
Court found that loss of citizenship as a criminal penalty for desertion was cruel and 
unusual punishment, thus invalidating part of 1940 Act.  In Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) the Supreme Court reached a similar result for individuals 
who evaded military service, invalidating part of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act. In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Court held that applying different 
loss of citizenship criteria to naturalized vs. natural-born citizens was 
unconstitutional.  Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) established the constitutional 
requirement that relinquishment of U.S. nationality must be 
                                                 
70 The term “fifth column” refers to a situation in which enemy supporters have infiltrated society, 
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attributed to General Emilio Mola Vidal, who, while marching four columns of troops toward Madrid 
during the Spanish Civil War, noted that upon his arrival in Madrid, he expected support from his “fifth” 
column, consisting of supporters of his Nationalist cause who were already in Madrid. Encyclopedia 
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71 Richard Reeves, Infamy: The Shocking Story of the Japanese American Internment in World War II 
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voluntary.  Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) established that loss of nationality 
requires proof of specific intention to relinquish nationality, that it is constitutional for 
Congress to establish criteria regarding a presumption of voluntariness, that proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence was an appropriate standard of proof, and that intent can 
be determined by a person’s words and also by a fair inference from proven conduct.  
F. INTERNATIONAL LAW BACKGROUND 
The following is not an exhaustive review of every international treaty, 
agreement, or convention that has some bearing on the ability of a member nation to 
implement terrorism-related loss of citizenship laws. Rather, this section provides an 
overview of three significant sources of international law affecting the loss of citizenship, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1954 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons, and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. These were selected because they represent key post-World 
War II efforts by the international community to establish relevant ground rules for 
dealing with loss of citizenship. In many ways they are the international community’s 
answer to the U.S. statement of principle embodied in the preamble to 1868 Act. Where 
many world nations previously balked at the notion of loss and acquisition of nationality 
as fundamental human rights, these modern documents reflect statements of international 
principle and in some instances international law that embrace those concepts, and 
attempt to establish protections and constraints on nations to ensure uniform treatment of 
individuals, regardless of whether they are seeking or suffering from loss of nationality. 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The United Nations was established in 1945 after the conclusion of World War II 
to promote international cooperation, avoid more war, and “reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small.”72  It is the successor to the League of 
                                                 
72 “United Nations Charter,” United Nations, accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/
sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html. See also, “About the UN,” United Nations, accessed 
September 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/about-un/index.html.  
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Nations, which was formed with similar goals following World War I, but which lapsed 
into irrelevancy with the advent of illiberal regimes in Europe on the eve of World  
War II.73   
Among the first efforts undertaken by the fledgling UN was the drafting of a 
document intended to reflect consensus on human rights, recognized by all nations. The 
chairperson of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which was charged 
with drafting the document that became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was 
Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt.74  Mrs. Roosevelt 
was a vocal proponent of, and America’s first delegate to the United Nations. She 
considered her work drafting and ultimately “securing adoption of the Declaration as her 
greatest achievement.”75 The legal effect and consequence of the UDHR on the member 
states of the United Nations is a subject of some debate. The UDHR is not a treaty or 
convention, and as such does not establish any binding obligations.76  Nevertheless, it has 
been very influential. Certainly it has been an important source of principle and ethical 
guidance for nations, courts, and lawmakers for more than 60 years.77   
                                                 
73 “History of the United Nations,” United Nations, accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.un.org/
en/sections/history/history-united-nations/. 
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Some argue the UDHR, or parts of it, have acquired the status of customary 
international law.78  Customary international law can be defined as follows: “Customary 
international law refers to international obligations arising from established state 
practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international treaties…[It 
is] one of the sources of international law…Put another way, ‘customary international 
law’ results from a general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense 
of legal obligation.”79 
The portion of the UDHR directly relevant to the issue of terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship is Article 15, which states, that “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality, [and 
that] [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality.”80  This guiding statement of principle acknowledges that 
individuals are vested with certain rights relating to acquisition and loss of nationality. In 
many ways, this is nothing more than a restatement and further explication of the 
principles embedded in the preamble to the Expatriation Act of 1868, which declared, 
“expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment 
of the rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness…”81   
Article 15 has proved to be an enduring and influential statement regarding 
matters pertaining to the loss and acquisition of citizenship. 
2. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless People 
In the aftermath of World War II, the emergence of international human rights as 
a cause to be pursued, combined with the absence of international agreement regarding 
                                                 
78 See e.g., “International Human Rights Law: Non-Treaty Standards,” Lawyers Rights Watch 
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the treatment of both refugees and stateless persons, resulted in the fledgling United 
Nations undertaking efforts to address these problems.82  In particular, the UN’s 
Commission on Human Rights began efforts to study and address these problems shortly 
after it came into existence, and initially under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt. It is 
perhaps not a coincidence that major changes in U.S. law relating to immigration, 
including the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which was the last instance of 
comprehensive immigration reform in the United States, and later in the interpretation of 
U.S. law relating to loss of nationality, took place in the 1950s and 1960s while the 
international community was continuing to recover from the effects of World War II. 
Statelessness as a matter of modern international concern came to the fore 
following World War I, and was exacerbated by the events of, and following World War 
II. One commentator has identified five causes for the problem of statelessness in Europe: 
(1) Nationality laws allowing nations to expatriate their citizens; (2) International treaties 
and agreements intended to resolve territorial disputes following the collapse of “old 
empires” like Austria-Hungary but that failed to resolve questions of citizenship; (3) the 
longstanding notion that a woman’s citizenship followed her husband’s, which resulted in 
loss of citizenship upon marriage but didn’t necessarily result in acquisition of citizenship 
upon marriage, and became more problematic on divorce; (4) inadequate laws addressing 
children’s acquisition of citizenship; and (5) individuals voluntarily or involuntarily 
displaced from their home country who can’t or won’t acknowledge citizenship of any 
nation out of fear of forced repatriation.83 
The 1954 Convention defined statelessness and endeavored to establish basic 
ground rules for the treatment and management of stateless individuals by member 
countries. A stateless person is defined in Article I of the convention as “a person who is 
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Congress 1955, accessed September 10, 2016, https://www.oas.org/dil/1954_Convention_relating_ 
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not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”84  Relevant to 
this thesis, countries bound by the 1954 Convention include the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and France.85   
3. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
A barrier some countries will face when considering new measures to strip 
citizens of nationality as a result of terrorist activity is the 1961 United Nations 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.86 The 1961 Convention presently has five 
signatories and 66 parties.87  Included among the nations bound by the 1961 Convention 
are the United Kingdom, Australia, and France.88 Although the United States supports 
                                                 
84 “1954 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless People,” UNHCR, accessed 
September 10, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html.  
85 The United States has traditionally taken the position that one of the rights an individual has in the 
context of expatriation is the right to render himself or herself stateless.  “The Stateless in the United 
States,” Center for Migration Studies, May 28, 2013, accessed September 10, 2016, http://cmsny.org/the-
stateless-in-the-united-states/. As such, the U.S. has declined to sign on to both the 1954 Convention on the 
Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
86 “1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” UNHCR.  
87 Ibid. The complicated language and procedures associated with international treaties/conventions 
merits a short discussion. The meaning of treaties and international agreements and the language and 
processes by which nations agree to be bound are, themselves, governed or at least informed by a collection 
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Nations, accessed September 10, 2016, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/ 
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States in respect of Treaties,” United Nations, accessed September 10, 2016, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/ 
instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf.  ““Parties” refers to States and other entities with treaty-
making capacity which have expressed their consent to be bound by a treaty and where the treaty is in force 
for such States and entities.” “Definition of key terms used in the UN Treaty Collection,” United Nations, 
accessed September 10, 2016, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/ 
page1_en.xml#signatories. A “signatory” is a “country that …indicates its intention to “ratify” (become a 
“party”) [to a treaty or agreement] at a later date. Signing a treaty does not bind the country to it. However, 
it assumes an obligation of good faith to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the 
treaty.” “Glossary of Terms,” UNHCR, accessed September 10, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/home/
opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=44b5021d2&query=meaning%20of%20accession%20to%20a%20treaty
%20or%20convention. “Succession” generally refers to a situation in which a one state has taken over the 
territory and responsibilities of another state. “1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in 
respect of Treaties,” United Nations. “Accession” and “ratification” have the same effect, in that they 
reflect a nation’s consent to be bound by an agreement. “What is the difference between signing, 
ratification and accession of UN treaties?,” Ask DAG! - United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 
accessed September 10, 2016, http://ask.un.org/faq/14594.  
88 “State Parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” UNHCR, accessed 
September 10, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html? 
docid=3bbb24d54&query=1961%20convention. 
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the fundamental principles underlying the 1961 Convention and the goal of reducing 
statelessness generally, it declined to join. The United States has long maintained a self-
deterministic view of loss of nationality. In particular, the U.S. takes the position that an 
individual has the right to renounce his or her citizenship, even if that decision would 
leave the individual stateless. The U.S. also balked at other restrictions contained in the 
1961 Convention relating to how states may confer citizenship.89  
The 1961 Convention was an effort to further the work begun with the 1954 
Convention. Where the 1954 Convention was fundamentally focused on recognizing and 
providing basic rights to those afflicted by statelessness, the 1961 Convention was 
focused on reducing or eliminating the legal hurdles leading to the creation or 
perpetuation of statelessness as a condition.90 The key limiting language in the 1961 
Convention is found in Article 8, which provides, “A Contracting State shall not deprive 
a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless.”91  It is notable 
in this regard that there is a distinction between deprivation of nationality and loss of 
nationality for purposes of the 1961 Convention. Loss of nationality under the 1961 
Convention refers to “withdrawal of nationality which is automatic, by operation of law 
(‘ex lege’). The term ‘deprivation’ (‘privation’ in French) is used in the Convention in 
Article 8 to describe situations where the withdrawal is initiated by the authorities of the 
State. [By comparison], UDHR Article 15 forbids ‘arbitrary deprivation’ and makes no 
mention of loss of nationality.”92  
                                                 
89 “Nationality, Citizenship, and Immigration,” Chapter 1 of Digest of United States Practice of 
International Law 2006, ed. Sally J. Cummins (Oxford University Press International Law Institute, 2006), 
accessed September 10, 2016, https://books.google.com/books?id=izjRCwAAQBAJ&printsec= 
frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.    
90 It had previously been presumed, for example, that some stateless persons would qualify as 
refugees under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, entitling them seek 
and obtain asylum from member nations; however, in practice it shortly became evident that many were 
unable to “acquire citizenship in their country of habitual residence yet do not qualify as refugees…and 
have no claim to asylum.” “Nationality and Statelessness, A Handbook for Parliamentarians,” UNHCR, 
2005, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20070626/libe/leclerc_en.pdf.  
91 “1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” UNHCR.  
92 “Expert Meeting, Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness 
resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality, Summary Conclusions,” UNHCR, October 31-
November 1, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/5465e2cb9.pdf. 
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While the 1961 Convention expressly prohibits states from enacting laws that 
would create stateless people through deprivation of nationality, this prohibition is 
subject to a variety of caveats.93 For example, a state that, prior to agreeing to the 1961 
Convention, had a law providing for forfeiture of citizenship flowing from actions 
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State,” could retain and continue to 
apply that law, even if it resulted in statelessness. Retention required that, at the time of 
joining the 1961 Convention, the State in question must have issued an express statement 
to that effect.94  Similarly, with a proper written statement issued at the time of agreeing 
to be bound by the 1961 Convention, another exception allows continued withdrawal of 
citizenship even if statelessness would result, from individuals who, “in disregard of an 
express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued to render services to, 
or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State.”95   
The practical meaning of these exceptions has been a matter of further discussion 
for the UNHCR. In 2013, a meeting took place in Tunisia to examine issues related to the 
ongoing interpretation and application of the 1961 Convention and its exceptions.96  This 
meeting was one in a series that took place for the purpose of “drafting guidelines under 
UNHCR’s statelessness mandate.”97  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the issue of terrorism came 
up. Regarding the exception for “conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the 
State,” the UNHCR expert group concluded that while it “does not cover criminal 
offences of a general nature…acts of treason, espionage and—depending on their 
interpretation in domestic law— ‘terrorist acts’ may be considered to fall within the 
scope of this paragraph.”98   
Still, the 1961 Convention does not constrain member states’ ability to use 
deprivation of citizenship as a tool combat terrorism as much as one might think. As a 
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general matter, a member state cannot, consistent with its obligations under the 1961 
Convention, use deprivation of citizenship as a tool to combat terrorism if it would lead 
to statelessness. But, if an individual is a dual citizen, a member state could deprive him 
or her of citizenship because the individual would continue to hold citizenship elsewhere. 
Further, a member state that made an express reservation under Article 8 of the 1961 
Convention could, in reliance on pre-existing law, “deprive a person of his 
nationality…[for conduct] seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State,” even he 
or she would be left stateless.99  
As noted previously, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France all agreed to be 
bound by the 1961 Convention; however, among them, only the United Kingdom and 
France expressly reserved rights under Article 8.   
The United Kingdom, an original signer of the Convention, made the following 
reservation: 
[The Government of the United Kingdom declares that], in accordance 
with paragraph 3 (a) of Article 8 of the Convention, notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 8, the United Kingdom retains the 
right to deprive a naturalised person of his nationality on the following 
grounds, being grounds existing in United Kingdom law at the present 
time: that, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to Her Britannic Majesty, 
the person  (i) Has, in disregard of an express prohibition of Her Britannic 
Majesty, rendered or continued to render services to, or received or 
continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or  (ii) Has 
conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
Her Britannic Majesty.100 
According to the foregoing, the U.K reserved the power to “deprive a naturalised 
person of his nationality.” This functionally creates two classes of citizenship in the U.K. 
The U.K. cannot, consistent with its duties under the 1961 Convention, withdraw 
citizenship from a person who was born a British citizen under circumstances that would 
render the person stateless, but it can take such action with regard to a naturalized citizen. 
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France, which signed the 1961 Convention on May 31, 1962, and thus was also 
among the first to join the Convention, made the following express reservation: 
At the time of signature of this Convention, the Government of the French 
Republic declares that it reserves the right to exercise the power available 
to it under article 8 (3) on the terms laid down in that paragraph, when it 
deposits the instrument of ratification of the Convention. 
The Government of the French Republic also declares, in accordance with 
article 17 of the Convention, that it makes a reservation in respect of 
article 11, and that article 11 will not apply so far as the French Republic 
is concerned. 
The Government of the French Republic further declares, with respect to 
article 14 of the Convention, that in accordance with article 17 it accepts 
the jurisdiction of the Court only in relation to States Parties to this 
Convention which shall also have accepted its jurisdiction subject to the 
same reservations; it also declares that article 14 will not apply when there 
exists between the French Republic and another party to this Convention 
an earlier treaty providing another method for the settlement of disputes 
between the two States.101 
Australia made no express reservation when it joined the 1961 Convention, and 
thus cannot implement withdrawal of citizenship provisions that could render an 
individual stateless while remaining compliant with its obligations under the 1961 
Convention. 
A final note regarding the 1961 Convention: The UNHCR expert group that 
commented on the meaning of the 1961 Convention in 2013 raised an interesting point 
regarding the practical consequences resulting from the creation of stateless people. The 
group noted that, “[t]he experience of some States indicates that governments do not gain 
from rendering individuals stateless…because it may be difficult in practice to expel the 
persons concerned.”102 This cautionary comment acknowledges the reality that a State 
that withdraws citizenship from a citizen within that State’s borders, rendering the 
individual stateless, can create a potentially insurmountable problem. A State that 
rendered stateless a citizen presently located within its borders based on terrorist acts 
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would find it difficult or impossible to remove or otherwise deport that person. Which 
nation would voluntarily agree to accept such an individual?  What international air 
carrier would accept such a person aboard a flight?  States considering loss of citizenship 
solutions to the problem of terrorism must consider these and other diplomatic and 
practical consequences that may obtain upon rendering a person stateless.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The development of U.S. law regarding acquisition and loss of citizenship reflects 
the evolution of our understanding of what citizenship means in America, how U.S. 
citizenship affects our citizens at home and abroad, and the meaning and interpretation of 
the Constitution. At the birth of our nation, the United States, out of necessity, welcomed 
individuals from Europe and elsewhere, even as we struggled as a nation to acknowledge 
the basic humanity and fundamental rights of slaves brought to or born in the United 
States. As our nation grew in the 19th century, pressures exerted by forces in the United 
States began to affect our willingness as a nation to continue to welcome what Emma 
Lazarus would describe in her poem The New Colossus as “your tired, your poor, your 
huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.”103 
As we fought amongst ourselves about slavery, U.S. citizens travelling abroad were 
imperiled by foreign nations who refused to acknowledge their U.S. citizenship, and U.S. 
citizens at home began to see immigration as both a benefit to business, and a threat to 
the U.S. labor market. These forces simultaneously drove efforts to bring in immigrant 
workers and to restrict their ability to become citizens.   
In the context of loss of nationality, important milestones occurred, including the 
1868 Act, which acknowledged as a fundamental right the ability of an individual to 
exchange one nationality for another, and the 14th Amendment, which defined who is a 
citizen for Constitutional purposes.   
The somewhat expansive view of U.S. citizenship incorporated into the 14th 
Amendment and the tumultuous nature of world events, including World War I, perhaps 
                                                 
103 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” 1883, accessed September 10, 2016, https://www.poets.org/
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contributed to U.S. isolationism as reflected in U.S. immigration law in the early 20th 
century, culminating in the Asiatic Barred Zone, which prevented immigration to the U.S. 
from most of the worlds’ largest continent. In the context of loss of nationality, U.S. law 
finally began to reflect Congressional understanding of the events that should trigger loss 
of U.S. citizenship. Later, World War II taught us a shameful lesson about how loss of 
citizenship could be abused to allay unfounded fears about the loyalty of U.S. citizens 
having a particular ethnic heritage.   
The post-World War II era saw significant change in U.S. immigration law, 
particularly regarding loss of citizenship. The passage of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 replaced ethnic bars to immigration with immigration quotas. It also codified 
a more constrained collection of expatriating acts than existed in prior statutory 
enactments. In addition, the Supreme Court undertook review of a series of loss of 
citizenship cases which served to further map out the metes and bounds of Congress’ 
authority to strip citizenship from U.S. citizens. Those efforts culminated in the Court’s 
acknowledgement of significant protections to U.S. citizenship, including the fact that 
U.S. citizenship can only be withdrawn from a U.S. citizen if the individual commits a 
statutory expatriating act voluntarily, and does so with the intention of losing his or her 
citizenship. But these important decisions rested on narrow margins, and left open 
important questions, such as how Congress, and executive branch agencies administering 
loss of citizenship law, can interpret the “intent” requirement, and what if any statutory 
presumptions might be appropriate.  
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III. FOREIGN LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP SOLUTIONS — U.K., 
AUSTRALIA, AND FRANCE 
This chapter provides a review of post-9/11 terrorism-related loss-of-nationality 
provisions that have been considered and either adopted or rejected by the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and France. The efforts of other western nations to draft and 
implement terrorism-related loss-of-citizenship laws provides insights into process, 
language, and legal mechanisms that can inform the review of comparable laws being 
considered in the United States.   
A. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom is no stranger to the effects of terror-motivated violence. In 
the 20th century, the conflict in Northern Ireland was the chief source of terror in Great 
Britain. Despite the prevalence and persistence of bombings as a tool of that conflict, loss 
of nationality was not a tool employed by the government to fight that wave of terror.104  
Following the events of September 11, 2001, efforts were made to “expand the powers of 
the Secretary of State to deprive someone of citizenship.”105 The Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 
2006, and the Immigration Act 2014 effected changes to the law that conferred expansive 
powers on the British Secretary of State to deprive citizens of their British nationality.106  
In addition, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 expanded the power of the 
government to seize passports, temporarily exclude citizens from returning to the UK, 
and gave the government additional tools to use to address the problems of radicalization.   
                                                 
104 Sandra Mantu, “Citizenship Deprivation in the United Kingdom,” Tilburg Law Review 19 (2014): 
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2016, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/1991-02-01?timeline=true, with British Nationality 
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Although the events of 9/11 provided the last big push necessary to get the ball 
rolling with regard to changing British loss of citizenship law to expand the government’s 
power to deprive a person of citizenship, in the U.K. loss of citizenship had been a 
subject of concern simmering just beneath the surface. As commentator Bobbi Mills 
noted, “The reappearance of this disused power in 2002 was part of the response to the 
attacks on the World Trade Centre. However, a conversation about ‘making British 
citizenship mean something’ had been underway before the terror attacks. The so-called 
race riots of early 2001 involved clashes between young Asian men and members of the 
English Defence League in northern England. The 1990s vision of multiculturalism was 
declared a failure as claims emerged about a lack of integration of Asian communities, 
and particularly of Muslims in Britain. The changes enacted in the [Nationality, 
Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002] were therefore partly responding to debates on 
integration, although the advent of the War on Terror lit a fire under these debates.”107   
In 2014, further changes in the law were proposed and ultimately passed, resulting 
from difficulties associated with withdrawing British citizenship from individuals 
involved in terrorist activities in specific situations108 (see Appendix A). 
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1. U.K. Terrorism-Related Loss of Citizenship 
The authority granted to the Home Secretary under law to deprive British citizens 
of their citizenship is quite broad. The Home Secretary can deprive a citizen of British 
nationality109 under circumstances common to most immigration systems, such as when a 
naturalized citizen obtained citizenship by fraud or otherwise improperly; however, under 
section 40 of the British Nationality Act (as amended) the Home Secretary can also 
deprive someone of British Citizenship if she is “satisfied that deprivation is conducive to 
the public good.”110  In applying this provision, “Conduciveness to the Public Good” is 
defined as “depriving [of citizenship] in the public interest on the grounds of involvement 
in terrorism, espionage, serious organized crime, war crimes or unacceptable 
behaviours.”111 Interestingly, while as a general matter the Home Secretary cannot 
deprive a person of British citizenship if it would render the person stateless, that 
limitation does not apply in all instances. If a naturalized citizen acts in a manner that is 
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom…” and if the Secretary 
“has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country 
or territory outside the United Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or 
territory” the Secretary may deprive the person of citizenship.112  In such an instance, the 
Secretary is empowered to deprive an individual of British citizenship, even if it would 
render the person stateless.113   
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The U.K. recently published a review of its own withdrawal of nationality law, 
and changes to it, that dealt in part with compliance with treaties and conventions, 
including the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1997 European 
Convention on Nationality, which is a treaty drafted under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe and that the United Kingdom has thus far declined to join.114  It concluded that 
U.K. law, as revised and amended, is compliant with the U.K.’s international law 
obligations.115 However, commentators raised interesting concerns about the 
consequences of the U.K. using its deprivation authority to create a stateless person 
outside of the U.K.116 For example, one commentator suggested that the U.K. should 
only consider using its deprivation authority to render a person stateless if the person is in 
the U.K.117  Where a primary basis for withdrawing British citizenship in this instance 
would be that it was “conducive to the public good,”118 it is difficult to understand how 
the public good would be served by allowing a person who joined a terrorist organization, 
or otherwise engaged in or supported terrorism, to become stateless and remain in the 
U.K.  
A report published in 2015 indicates that since 2006, the U.K. has deprived 53 
people of their British citizenship.119  The bulk of these cases involved individuals who 
had dual citizenship in a broad range of countries, including without limitation Russia, 
Somalia, Yemen, Australia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Albania, Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan, 
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Vietnam, Iran, Iraq and Nigeria.120 A 2014 article described one such case, in which a 
“51-year-old man, who was born in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and his London-born sons, 
who are all in their twenties, had their British nationality rescinded …while they were out 
of the country.”121 The man alleged that he and his sons were improperly targeted for 
deprivation of citizenship based on the fact that his daughter had previously, “travelled to 
Syria with a jihadist.”  The Secretary of State, on the other hand, indicated that the man 
and his sons “are active members of Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) and…that they have links 
to al-Qaeda…”122 In another recent case, a naturalized citizen described in public 
documents only as “M2” was deprived of U.K. citizenship while outside of the U.K. on 
the basis of having provided support to al-Qaida, but was nonetheless able to return to the 
U.K. using an Afghan passport bearing appropriate reentry stamps.123  
2. Lessons for the U.S. from U.K. Law 
U.K. law provides few if any examples that U.S. legislators could look to for 
purposes of modifying or improving comparable bills in the U.S. Current U.S. law 
regarding loss of citizenship is focused on specific actions, such as joining a foreign 
armed force, accepting a senior position in a foreign government, or committing treason. 
U.K. law instead relies on broadly worded discretion invested in the Home Secretary, and 
focuses not on the specific action committed by the citizen, but on the consequence to the 
U.K. Fundamentally, U.K. laws are constructed differently than their U.S. counterparts in 
this area. It is qualitative where U.S. law is more enumerative. In addition to this very 
different approach to assessing loss of citizenship, it is unclear whether U.S. law could 
support deprivation of U.S. citizenship under the broad banner of conduciveness to the 
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public good, even given the further definition to include espionage, terrorism, and the 
broad catchall “unacceptable behaviors.”124  Likewise, “conduct seriously prejudicial to 
the vital interests” of the nation is also a qualitative standard tied to the effect on the 
nation, rather than an enumerative standard focused on the individual’s specific act.   
 U.K. law also treats naturalized citizens differently than individuals who 
acquired U.K. citizenship at birth. Under the U.K. system, as most recently amended, 
only naturalized U.K. citizens may be deprived of citizenship under circumstances that 
would leave them stateless. While most nations, including the U.S., have processes to 
denaturalize citizens who fraudulently acquire citizenship through the naturalization 
process, a consequence necessarily inapplicable to individuals born citizens and thus 
suggesting some difference between naturalized and natural born citizens, that difference 
is inapposite here. Preventing fraud is not an instance of disparate treatment, but rather a 
necessary part of ensuring the integrity of a country’s naturalization system. U.S. law 
would likely prohibit disparate treatment of properly naturalized citizens in the context of 
deprivation of nationality.125 
B. AUSTRALIA 
In December of 2015 Australia modified its law to permit the withdrawal of 
Australian citizenship on terrorism grounds by passing the Australian Citizenship 
Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015, and creating new terrorism-related 
mechanisms by which Australians can lose their citizenship.126  (See Appendix A.)  An 
explanatory memorandum issued by Parliament explained need for the bill. It noted that 
the Australian government had conducted an assessment and determined that a variety of 
troubling terrorism risk factors were increasing, including “the number of foreign 
                                                 
124 “ILPA Briefing for the Immigration Bill, House of Lords Committee stage, Part 6, Miscellaneous, 
Clause 60 Deprivation if conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK,” Immigration Law 
Practitioners Association, March 15, 2014, accessed September 11, 2016, http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/
resources/25900/14.03.15-Deppivation-of-citizenship-HL-Comm-finalpdf.pdf. It is notable that a “public 
good” standard is the same standard that the U.K. applies in the context of deporting foreign nationals. Ibid. 
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fighters” the “number of knowns sympathizers and supporters of extremists,” and “the 
number of potential terrorists.”127  The Australian Citizenship Amendment bill was 
proposed as part of an effort by the government to address what Australian legislators 
perceived as a growing terrorist threat to Australia and its citizens. The explanatory 
memorandum provided additional detail, explaining why loss of citizenship was being 
pursued as a means of addressing this problem. It stated: 
As the basic requisite for participation in and adherence to the values and 
institutions of Australia’s secular democracy, citizenship does not simply 
bestow privileges or rights, but entails fundamental responsibilities. As set 
out in the preamble to the Citizenship Act, Australian citizenship gives full 
and formal membership of the Australian community and is a common 
bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting all Australians 
while respecting their diversity. Those who are citizens owe their loyalty 
to Australia and its people. This applies to those who acquire citizenship 
automatically through birth in Australia and to those who acquire it 
through application. Where a person is no longer loyal to Australia and its 
people, and engages in acts that harm Australians or Australian interests, 
or engages in acts that are intending to harm Australian or Australia’s 
interest, they have severed that bond and repudiated their allegiance to 
Australia.128  
This statement of purpose is consistent with the language and spirt of Senator Joe 
Lieberman’s statement that, “If you have joined an enemy of the United States in 
attacking the United States and trying to kill Americans, I think you sacrifice your rights 
of citizenship.”129  
1. Australian Terrorism-Related Loss of Citizenship Law 
Australia’s version of terrorism-related loss of citizenship is quite different from 
that of the U.K. Where U.K. law incorporates broad discretionary concepts, Australian 
law, like U.S. law, ties specific enumerated acts and associated intention to the 
expatriation consequence. Australia avoids the difficulty associated with creating 
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stateless persons in the context of terrorism-related loss of nationality by requiring 
alternate nationality, without exception, in the context of terrorism-related withdrawal of 
citizenship. This legislative drafting decision renders most statelessness-related concerns 
effectively moot.130   
Australia also avoids concerns regarding unequal application of loss of citizenship 
provisions, or the notion of creating different classes of citizen for purposes of terrorism-
related withdrawal of citizenship. All of Australia’s new terrorism-related provisions 
apply to all dual nationals, regardless of how they acquired Australian citizenship. Unlike 
the U.K., which applies its most severe form of deprivation of citizenship only to 
naturalized citizens,131 Australia makes no distinction between naturalized citizens and 
individuals who were born with Australian citizenship.   
Australia’s overseas terrorism-related expatriation provisions are generally 
restricted to activities performed on behalf or for the benefit of a declared terrorist 
organization.132 The list of declared terrorist organizations is available online.133  
Domestically, loss may take place as a result of conviction of designated crimes, 
including terrorism offenses, and is not limited to activities related to declared terrorist 
organizations.134  The requirement that an individual be a dual national also applies when 
loss of citizenship occurs following conviction of an applicable offense; however, the 
loss determination is not made by the convicting court. In all instances, loss of citizenship 
is determined administratively by the Minister for Border Immigration and Border 
                                                 
130 Some legitimate concerns do remain. Dual nationals who acquire Australian citizenship as 
refugees from another nation might formally retain their former nationality, but may nevertheless be 
rendered “de facto” stateless because returning to that former nation may be impossible. See “Submission 
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renders them stateless. See, Immigration Act of 2014 Part 6, Section 66. 
132 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 at 33AA(4), 35(1)(b)(ii). 
133 “Listed terrorist organisations,” Australian National Security, Australian Government, accessed 
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Protection personally and cannot be delegated;135 however, in support of the Minister and 
for purposes of providing guidance and recommendations regarding the exercise of this 
new loss of citizenship authority, the Australian Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection established a Citizenship Loss Board, made up of representatives from a 
variety of federal government bodies.136  
No published statistics exist regarding use of the new Australian law to withdraw 
citizenship from Australian dual nationals. The bill only became law in December of 
2015. In response to a Freedom of Information request, Australia’s Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection released the minutes of the first Citizenship Loss 
Board, held on February 23, 2016. In the draft minutes under the heading “Agenda Item 
5—progress of cases” it states as follows: “[Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection] provided a general update on the progress of potential candidates for 
citizenship loss. The Board discussed potential timeframes for consideration of the 
cases,” followed by markings indicating redaction of additional text accompanied by a 
code relating to the Freedom of Information section justifying the redaction. Based on 
this document, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Australia is presently considering 
potential cases to which the new law may be applied. 
Australia’s amended terrorism-related loss of citizenship law results in loss 
occurring immediately. Both the “renunciation by conduct” (33AA of the amended law) 
and “service outside Australia in the armed forces of a … declared terrorist organization” 
(35 of the amended law) sections provide that loss takes place at the time the person 
engages in the prohibited conduct.137  The extraordinary discretion extended to the Home 
                                                 
135 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 at 33AA(20), 35(15), 
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Secretary in the U.K. version of these laws is to some degree mirrored in the discretion 
necessary to implement 33AA and 35 of the amended law. As noted by the Refugee 
Council of Australia in its commentary regarding these amendments, “There is no 
requirement, for example, that a person must have been convicted of a terrorist offence. 
Indeed, proposed sections 33AA(12) and 35A allow the Minister to rely on intelligence 
information, including information that does not amount to a security assessment.”138 In 
this way, a great deal of discretion is incorporated into the government’s administration 
of these provisions. It is unclear whether deprivation of nationality under these 
circumstances would be considered “arbitrary” as that term is used in the UDHR.   
Australia significantly shields its decisions under 33AA and 35 from scrutiny and 
appeal by limiting those decisions to actions by Australians outside of Australia.139  
Although remedial measures exist to challenge loss decisions,140 the difficulty an 
individual may experience in successfully challenging his or her loss of citizenship, after 
the fact, from outside of Australia, suggests that obtaining review will be, at best, difficult 
for affected former Australians. Limiting the effectiveness of these provisions to 
individuals outside of Australia also means that Australia will in many situations avoid 
the often-difficult question of what to do with a person after citizenship is withdrawn. It 
will not be able to avoid this problem in all instances. Decisions under 35A, which 
permits the Minister to withdraw citizenship from an individual convicted of certain 
terrorism or related offenses enumerated in the statute, will take place in most instances 
regarding individuals in Australia.   
Removing or deporting individuals found to have engaged in terrorism-related 
activities poses difficulties for any nation, inasmuch as no nation can effectively remove 
or deport an individual from that nation to an alternate nation without permission from 
that alternate nation. In most instances, nations will reject requests to accept non-citizens 
                                                 
138 “Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security inquiry into 
the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015,” Refugee Council of Australia.  
139 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 at 33AA(7), 35(2). 
140 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 at note to 33AA(10) (“A 
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removed or deported from another nation, but cannot reject their own citizens. As such, 
deporting or removing a stateless person is difficult if not impossible. Australia has 
avoided these problems by limiting most terrorism-related expatriation to individuals 
already outside of Australia, and in all instances making terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship only applicable to individuals who hold alternate nationality.  
2. Lessons for the U.S. from Australian Law 
The Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 both 
in structure and content is considerably more like legislation that might be considered by 
the U.S. Congress than the U.K. legislation. But there are differences between U.S. and 
Australian law that are significant. In particular, the bill does not reflect the concept 
intrinsic to U.S. law that an individual can only lose citizenship if he or she commits an 
expatriating act intending by that act to lose citizenship. The new Australian law does 
incorporate an intent requirement in the context of “Renunciation by Conduct,” but the 
required intent relates to the purpose of the act itself, and amounts to a requirement that 
the government establish terrorist intent (i.e., acts done with the intention of 
“…advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause…” and “coercing, or influencing 
by intimidation, the government… or…intimidating the public or a section of the 
public.”)141   
Despite this difference, Australia’s creation of an intent requirement led to the 
creation of another legal provision that might be of interest to U.S. lawmakers. Australia 
incorporated into its law a statutory presumption regarding intent. Under the new 
Australian law, the required intent is presumed satisfied if at the time a statutory 
expatriating act was committed the individual was “a member of a declared terrorist 
organisation…or…acting on instruction of, or in cooperation with, a declared terrorist 
organisation.”142  While U.S. law regarding expatriation contains a legal presumption 
regarding voluntariness, and in some instances an administrative/regulatory presumption 
regarding intent, no statutory presumption regarding intent exists in U.S. law. U.S. 
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lawmakers may take particular note of the “Renunciation by Conduct” and “Service 
outside Australia in armed forces of an enemy country or a declared terrorist 
organization” provisions under Australian law, which at their core reflect concepts 
analogous to existing U.S. law.143  Other than treason, U.S. law does not presently 
provide for loss of citizenship resulting from a criminal conviction.144  For example, a 
provision previously existed which provided for loss of citizenship upon conviction of 
desertion during a time of war, but was later deemed unconstitutional as a “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”145   
There are other aspects of Australia’s new law that could provide ideas and 
guidance to U.S. legislators considering comparable legislation in Congress. Australia’s 
concern with statelessness as reflected in this new legislation derives in part from its 
obligations under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which does not 
bind the United States;146 however, in addition to obligations arising under international 
law and pursuant to treaty, both from a humanitarian and practical perspective, 
Australia’s legislative decision regarding this issue suggests a blueprint for U.S. 
legislators. The Australian bill applies only to individuals who already possess alternate 
nationality. From a humanitarian perspective, Australia avoids creating stateless 
individuals, a matter of great concern to the international community and to human rights 
organizations. From a practical perspective, creating stateless ex-citizens in the context of 
terrorism-related loss of citizenship would result in problems for Australia.   
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A hypothetical stateless ex-citizen within Australia who lost citizenship on 
terrorism grounds would be difficult or impossible to remove from Australia, as no nation 
could be reasonably expected to admit that person. Likewise, if Australia were to create 
stateless ex-citizens outside of Australia, that action would affect Australia’s relationship 
with other nations. When a foreign nation accepts an Australian (or indeed any foreigner) 
into its territory on a non-immigrant basis (i.e., not as a potential immigrant), the 
admission is made in part in reliance on the individual’s intention and ability to return to 
his or her home nation. By rendering a person stateless in a foreign nation’s territory, 
Australia would be liable to diplomatic complaint, and could be forced to accept return of 
the individual.147  
American legislators considering terrorism-related loss of citizenship legislation 
would benefit from reviewing the Australian dual-citizenship requirement. Although U.S. 
law presently incorporates provisions, such as the voluntary renunciation provision at 
INA § 349(a)(5), which leave open the opportunity for U.S. citizens to potentially seek 
and achieve intentional statelessness, that concept need not be pervasively incorporated 
into all loss of citizenship provisions under U.S. law. Considering a dual-nationality 
restriction in the context of possible U.S. terrorism-related loss of citizenship legislation 
might prove beneficial.  
C. FRANCE 
Following the Paris attacks in November of 2015, a proposal to amend French 
loss of citizenship law was offered. Unlike the U.K. and Australia, French law already 
contained provisions enabling withdrawal of French citizenship for conviction of terrorist 
acts. However, in late 2015 and early 2016 France considered, but ultimately rejected a 
constitutional amendment that would have permitted the passage of even broader 
terrorism-related deprivation of nationality (déchéance de nationalité) laws, including 
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International Law.”  
 50 
laws permitting withdrawal of citizenship from individuals who acquired French 
citizenship at birth.148  The proposed constitutional change relevant to terrorism-related 
loss of citizenship149 was a consequence of prior failed efforts to expand the loss of 
citizenship provisions under the Civil Code of France. Sandra Mantu, in her review of the 
proposed constitutional amendment, explained as follows: “Prior to this constitutional 
bill, there have been several unsuccessful attempts to modify the provisions of the Civil 
Code in respect of citizenship deprivation. In 2014 proposals were put forward to deprive 
of citizenship all French dual nationals if arrested, caught or identified fighting against 
the French armed forced, their allies or the French police forces. The proposal was 
rejected by the Constitutional Law Commission of the French Parliament. This failure 
explains the need to amend the French Constitution since most political parties and the 
executive believed that the Constitutional Council will not approve an ordinary law 
allowing dual nationals to lose French nationality acquired at birth.”150   
In support of this change French President Francois Hollande had announced to a 
special joint session of Parliament that France was “at war” and the change was 
necessary.151 Despite some public support,152 the proposed amendment was ultimately 
abandoned.153  France has a history of denaturalizing certain disfavored citizen groups. 
During World War II, the Vichy government denaturalized, “110,000 Algerian Jews and 
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a further 15,152 French citizens who had naturalised since 1927.”154  In addition to 
concerns grounded in the historical echoes of World War II, one critic noted, “The 
constitution is a text that is written to unify the people and this does the opposite. People 
know that reinforcing the cohesion of the nation is, in the long term, the only way to 
defeat terrorism, and this proposal creates an immediate division in the country.”155 
1. French Terrorism-Related Loss of Citizenship Law 
Unlike the U.K. and Australia, France first addressed terrorism-related loss of 
nationality before the events of 9/11. Resulting from terrorist activities in the 1990s 
related to the Algerian Civil War, which included bombings in France, France amended 
Article 25 of the French Civil Code, adding a provision for loss of citizenship upon 
conviction and sentencing for “an offence which constitutes an act of terrorism.”156  It 
was already possible to withdraw citizenship from an individual after conviction and 
sentencing for acts constituting “an injury to the fundamental interests of the Nation.”157 
These provisions only apply to naturalized French citizens, and are subject to time 
limitations which make terrorism-related loss possible only if the act giving rise to the 
conviction occurred within 15 years of acquisition of French citizenship, and further a 
decision regarding terrorism-related loss must take place, if at all, within fifteen years of 
acquiring French citizenship.158  
As further described by Dr. Sandra Mantu, the deprivation process in France 
provides that, “[t]he person concerned must be notified of the government’s intention to 
deprive, and be given the opportunity to make observations and mount an appeal. The 
order to deprive has to specify the legal and factual grounds upon which the measure is 
taken; the authorities can proceed with deprivation only after the favorable opinion of the 
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Council of State. The Council of State is a body of the French government with a dual 
function: (a) legal adviser of the executive branch on state issues and legislation, and (b) 
supreme court for administrative justice. The concurring opinion is issued as part of its 
consultative function. Citizenship deprivation operates only for the future.”159  Since 9/
11 France has used Article 25’s terrorism and fundamental interests provisions to 
withdraw citizenship from 13 people.160  
2. Lessons for the U.S. from French Law 
French law provides few lessons for U.S. legislators. In France, a dual national 
who acquired French citizenship by naturalization can lose French citizenship if 
sentenced for certain crimes, including terrorism, as well as for acts “committed for the 
benefit of a foreign state…[that are] incompatible with the status of being French and 
detrimental to the interests of France,” and provided the acts were committed within 10 
years (or in the case of terrorism 15 years) of acquiring French nationality.161  This 
French statute as model for U.S. legislators is likely unworkable. Loss of citizenship as 
criminal punishment in the U.S., with the exception of Treason, has previously been held 
unconstitutional.162  An alternate perspective on this aspect of French law might view it 
as part of a secondary vetting process. French law provides elsewhere that conviction of a 
terrorist offense renders an individual ineligible to naturalize as a French citizen.163  
Similarly, under U.S. law, prior conviction of serious crimes, including terrorism crimes, 
renders an individual inadmissible to the United States and would disqualify such an 
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individual from eligibility to naturalize as a U.S. citizen.164  While French law could 
perhaps be viewed as offering an opportunity to engage in a species of post-naturalization 
vetting that may be necessary or appropriate considering the structure of French 
naturalization law, such a process would not fit well within the American legal scheme. It 
is notable that Article 25 applies to acts committed prior to acquisition of French 
nationality, as well as acts committed during a limited period of time following 
naturalization.165  In this way French law could also be viewed as creating a limited 
probationary period during which naturalized French citizenship is subject to forfeiture. 
There is no corollary in U.S. law to a probationary citizenship period. 
French citizenship law is quite complex, creating the potential for outcomes that 
diverge significantly from anything likely to arise under U.S. law.166  This is not 
surprising, as French and U.S. law treat people born in our respective nations differently, 
even at birth. Under U.S. law, a person born in the United States is citizen in virtually all 
instances;167 however, the mere fact of birth in France, without more, does not 
necessarily confer French citizenship.168  Regardless of whether current French 
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terrorism-related loss of citizenship law is viewed as a punitive consequence for 
conviction of certain serious crimes, as a secondary vetting process, or as part of a 
probationary citizenship period, U.S. legislators are unlikely to find much of interest in 
French loss of citizenship law. Its focus on naturalized citizens, and its basic structure and 
conditions, do not provide a model that would likely be workable in the U.S.   
Efforts to amend the French Constitution to permit expanded loss of citizenship 
legislation capable of withdrawing citizenship from individuals born French citizens are 
unnecessary in the United States, as loss of citizenship law in the United States would 
apply equally to naturalized citizens and individuals born citizens.   
Some have characterized recent efforts to expand the opportunity under French 
law to withdraw citizenship from a broader group of people, including individuals born 
French, as an effort to bring the “British Model” to France.169  Should France continue to 
consider modifying its law relevant to terrorism-related loss of citizenship, additional 
review would be appropriate to determine whether future proposed, or actual, changes to 
French law might offer innovative new ideas or valuable cautionary lessons to U.S. 
legislators. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This review of terrorism-related expatriation provisions pursued by the U.K., 
Australia, and France reflects very different approaches undertaken by these nations. The 
U.K. adopted legislation that relies heavily on governmental exercise of discretion, and 
that treats naturalized citizens differently than individuals born citizens. Under U.K. law, 
naturalized citizens can have their citizenship withdrawn, even if it would leave them 
stateless, and even if they happened to be in Britain at the time. Australia, on the other 
hand, implemented legislative changes that provide for less discretion, and establish 
clearer guidance. Australia’s laws draw no distinctions among citizens (naturalized or 
natural born), only permit loss of citizenship to take place regarding citizens located 
                                                 
169“The extension of the powers to citizens by birth was infrequently alluded to as the ‘British model’. 
These amendments were dismissed outright in the National Assembly as disproportionate and 
unconstitutional.” Bobbie Mills, “A Privilege, not a right: Contemporary debates on citizenship deprivation 
in Britain and France,”  
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outside of Australia, and do not permit loss to take place if it would render the individual 
stateless. However, under the Australian legislation, loss is effective immediately upon 
completion of the expatriating act, as opposed to upon completion of some administrative 
or formal legal process. The law provides for an appeal mechanism, but as practical 
matter, such a challenge would be difficult as the ex-citizen would be overseas. French 
law, which was amended before 9/11 to provide for limited terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship, provides little additional guidance for U.S. legislators. 
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IV. U.S. TERRORISM-RELATED LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP BILLS
AFTER 9/11 
This chapter reviews bills introduced to Congress since September 11, 2001, to 
address national security and related concerns arising from United States citizens 
engaging in or supporting terrorism through loss of citizenship.   
A. LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP UNDER CURRENT U.S. LAW — INA § 349 
Currently, loss of United States citizenship, other than as a result of fraud or 
misrepresentation in the naturalization process or in the acquisition of documents 
reflecting citizenship, occurs pursuant to INA § 349(a) and results from undertaking one 
of seven expatriating acts, including naturalizing as a citizen of a foreign state 
(§ 349(a)(1)), taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state (§ 349(a)(2)), serving in the 
armed forces of a foreign state (§ 349(a)(3)), accepting employment by a foreign 
government under certain circumstances (§ 349(a)(4)), renouncing your 
citizenship(§§ 349(a)(5) & (a)(6)), or treason (§ 349(a)(7)).170 (See Appendix B.)   
Loss of citizenship occurring as a result of acts described in subparagraphs (1) – 
(5) of section § 349(a) is generally administered by the United States Department of 
State.171 Determination of loss of nationality under § 349(a)(6)(wartime domestic 
renunciation) was previously administered by the Department of Justice, but following 
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, authority to administer this section 
transferred to DHS component United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.172  
170 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952)(as amended). 
171 See generally, 7 U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual § 1200 (2014), Loss and 
Restoration of U.S. Citizenship, https://fam.state.gov/fam/07fam/07fam1210.html.  
172 An Act to Establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes, Public Law 
107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), commonly known as the Homeland Security Act of 2002, accessed 
September 11, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf. See also, Kaufman v. Holder, 
686 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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Section 349(a)(7) requires conviction by a court martial or other court of competent 
jurisdiction of treason and/or related specific crimes.173  
B. TERRORISM-RELATED LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP BILLS 
INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS SINCE 9/11 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States Congress has 
undertaken a variety of extraordinary legislative measures aimed at reconceiving and 
strengthening the security of the American people and the nation. The most prominent 
feature of that reform was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security by virtue 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.174  The term “homeland security” was not in 
common use in the United States before the attacks of 9/11, but has since become 
ubiquitous in the lexicon of U.S. domestic security issues, and the federal agency bearing 
that name.   
Another legislative effort that began shortly after 9/11, and that has continued in 
various forms, involves legislation proposing mechanisms by which a U.S. citizen could 
lose citizenship as a result of engaging in or supporting terrorism. To date those 
legislative efforts have not been successful. U.S. law regarding loss of citizenship is 
subject to significant restrictions which primarily arose from Supreme Court cases 
decided during a period beginning in the late 1950s and continuing through 1980. Those 
cases include, most significantly, 1967’s Afroyim v. Rusk, which held perhaps 
173 Conviction of treason and related crimes is exceedingly rare. Treason is the only crime expressly 
defined in the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § 3. The last individual convinced of treason in the United 
States was Tomoya Kawakita. “The Case For Treason,” CBS News, December 17, 2001, accessed 
September 11, 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-case-for-treason/. See also, Kawakita v. U.S., 343 
U.S. 717 (1952). Mr. Kawakita was born in the United States in 1921 but qualified for Japanese citizenship 
as well. He travelled to Japan in 1939 with a relative and remained there throughout the war. While in 
Japan, in furtherance of the Japanese war effort, Mr. Kawakita was employed by a mining company as an 
interpreter. The mining company used United States prisoners of war as factory labor. Evidence 
demonstrated that while working for the mining company, Mr. Kawakita physically abused United States 
POW laborers and made repeated statements consistent with treasonous intent. The Supreme Court upheld 
his conviction. Ibid. Originally sentenced to death, his sentence was later commuted to life, and he was 
ultimately released and permitted to travel to Japan in 1963 on condition that he not return to the United 
States. “Kawakita, War Criminal, In Tokyo as a Japanese,” New York Times, December 13, 1963, accessed 
September 11, 2016, http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs5/kawakita2.pdf. See also, David Rosenzweig, “POW 
Camp Atrocities Led to Treason Trial,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2002, accessed September 11, 
2016, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/20/local/me-onthelaw20.  
174 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
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unsurprisingly that only a voluntary act can result in loss of citizenship, and 1980s Vance 
v. Terrazas, which somewhat more surprisingly held that an individual must affirmatively 
intend, when committing an expatriating act, to lose citizenship by virtue of that act.175  
These decisions wrested primary control over loss of citizenship from the federal 
government, and placed that control in the hands of the citizen. In post-9/11 America, this 
shift in control suggests questions about the meaning of citizenship in the United States. 
What is the meaning citizenship, who deserves to be a citizen, and if we decide someone 
has acted in a manner that should cause them to lose their citizenship, what can be done?  
Post-9/11 legislative proposals suggesting terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
consequences provide possible answers to those questions.  
Expanding statutory expatriation provisions under law is an issue likely to 
generate controversy, particularly as most Americans are not familiar with the legal 
prerequisites that underlie loss of citizenship in the United States. Further, these specific 
proposals are presented in the context of the politically and emotionally charged issue of 
terrorism, and in particular U.S. citizens alleged to support terrorism.  
1. The SAFER Act 
On November 19, 2003, Representative James J. Gresham Barret introduced H.R. 
3522, the SAFER Act of 2003.176 SAFER is an acronym derived from the full title of the 
act, “Securing America’s Future through Enforcement Reform.”177  At more than 200 
pages, the SAFER Act was directed at a variety of immigration reforms, including an 
amendment to INA § 349.178 Representative Barret proposed the following amendments 
to Section 349(a)(3) and 349(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act: 
 
 
                                                 
175 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980). 





(3)(A) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if— 
(i) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States; 
or 
(ii) such person serves as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer; or 
   (B) in the case of a naturalized American citizen, joining or serving in, or 
providing material support (as defined in section 2339A of title 18, United States 
Code) to a terrorist organization designated under section 212(a)(3) or 219 or 
designated under the International Emergency Powers Act, if the organization is 
engaged in hostilities against the United States, its people, or its national security 
interests.’; and 
 
…by adding at the end of subsection (b): “The voluntary commission or 
performance of an act described in subsection (a)(3)(A)(i) or (B) shall be prima 
facie evidence that the act was done with the intention of relinquishing United 
States nationality.”179 
 
Representative Barrett’s SAFER Act of 2003 was not seriously considered by 
Congress. He resubmitted the SAFER Act in 2005 as H.R. 688, with similar results.180   
a. Analysis and Issues under U.S. Law 
The SAFER Act included novel ideas, but also raised constitutional and other 
questions. Chief among the constitutional questions is the fact that the SAFER Act 
proposed to amend to INA § 349(a)(3)(B) to create a loss of citizenship consequence that 
would apply only to naturalized citizens. Although it is not uncommon among the loss of 
nationality laws of other nations to draw a distinction between naturalized citizens and 
individuals born with citizenship, such a distinction is problematic under U.S. law. The 
14th Amendment’s citizenship clause defines as citizens as “all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States.”181  Drawing a distinction for loss of citizenship 
purposes among United States citizens based on the manner in which they acquired 
citizenship raises significant constitutional concerns. Such a distinction was previously 
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1964 in Schneider v. Rusk, for relegating 
                                                 
179 SAFER Act of 2003, H.R. 3522, § 404, Expatriation of Terrorists. 
180 SAFER Act of 2005, H.R. 688, 109th Congress (2005),  https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
109/hr688. 
181 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.   
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naturalized citizens to “a second-class citizenship.”182  Although the Supreme Court in 
1971 in Rogers v. Bellei concluded that individuals who naturalize outside of the United 
States, or who acquire citizenship as a result of a statutory process while outside of the 
United States, necessarily fall outside of protection of the 14th Amendment and may be 
subject to requirements and restrictions that would not be possible if the 14th 
Amendment applied, that decision was fundamentally directed at acquisition of 
citizenship.183  For loss of citizenship purposes, drawing a distinction among United 
States citizens based on the manner in which the acquired citizenship, even after Rogers 
v. Bellei, is likely to fail. 
The SAFER Act also proposed to tie loss of citizenship to actions constituting 
“material support” to a designated terrorist organization, “if the organization is engaged 
in hostilities against the United States, its people, or its national security interests.”  
Tying loss of nationality to “material support” poses potential problems from an 
evidentiary and practical perspective. Use of “material support” by the federal 
government as a basis for agency decision-making has proved controversial and 
                                                 
182 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). In this case a naturalized U.S. citizen challenged her loss 
of nationality resulting from law existing at that time at and which only applied to naturalized U.S. citizens 
who returned and resumed living for three continuous years in “the territory of a foreign state of which 
[they were] formerly a national or in which the place of [their] birth is situated…”  In reversing the finding 
of loss, Justice Douglas writing for the majority identified the fundamental problem with this provision.  
“[A] native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss of citizenship. The 
discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work abroad in a way 
that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen be 
naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance, and in no way evidences a voluntary 
renunciation of nationality and allegiance.”  Ibid. at 169 (emphasis added). The Court’s decision was 5–3, 
with justices Clark, Harlan, and White dissenting. Justice Brennan did not participate in this decision. 
Justice Harlan, writing for the minority, accurately noted that “[t]here is nothing new about the practice of 
expatriating naturalized citizens who voluntarily return to their native lands to reside. It has a long-
established and widely accepted history.”  Ibid. at 170.   
183 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971). 
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challenging.184  In other contexts commentators have argued that the use of material 
support as a basis for administrative decision making is problematic because it “casts a 
broad net” capable of catching individuals “who do not present a risk to U.S. national 
security.”185  
Further, the proposal to establish a loss of citizenship consequence flowing from 
material support to a designated terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against our 
American “national security interests” is exceedingly vague.186  A federal agency 
attempting to administer a loss of citizenship provision based on actions against our 
national security interests would face a host of problems. There is no list or repository of 
U.S. national security interests, and the bill offers no formula or guidance about how this 
criterion should be determined, or what agency, agencies, or authorities would be 
                                                 
184 “The notion of material support to terrorism—the contribution of money, food, clothing, shelter, 
and other services to terrorist organizations—has been particularly harmful and has distracted policymakers 
from the humanitarian concerns that drive refugee resettlement and asylum.” Swetha Sridharan, “Material 
Support to Terrorism – Consequences for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the United States,” Migration 
Policy Institute, January 30, 2008, accessed September 11, 2016,  http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
material-support-terrorism-%E2%80%94-consequences-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-united-states. See 
also, Susan Hennessey, “Is DOJ Rethinking Material Support Laws and Domestic Terrorism,” Lawfare, 
February 5, 2016, accessed September 11, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/doj-rethinking-material-
support-laws-and-domestic-terrorism. Ms. Hennessey’s article raises questions regarding the disparate 
treatment under U.S. law of foreign and domestic terrorism in the context of material support, which has a 
disproportionate effect on Muslims. 
185 Bryan Clark and William Holahan, “Material Support: Immigration and National Security,” 
Catholic University Law Review 59 (2010): 935–948, accessed September 11, 2016, available at: 
http://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol59/iss4/2. Concerns relating to the broad interpretation of material 
support provisions under law have arisen in a variety of circumstances, particularly following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2011). See generally, Justin A. 
Fraterman, “Criminalizing Humanitarian Relief: Are U.S. Material Support For Terrorism Laws 
Compatible With International Humanitarian Law?,” NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 46,  
(2014): 399–470, http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/46.2-Fraterman.pdf. In one “concrete (and 
particularly absurd) example of this chill factor, it was reported in October 2009 that the U.S. State 
Department was sitting on USD $50 million worth of much-needed aid to Somalia out of fear that U.S. 
government employees administering this assistance would be exposed to prosecution under Executive 
Order 13,224 due to the fact that large parts of the country are controlled by Shabab, an Islamist group 
designated as a terrorist group by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). In fact, the State 
Department went so far as to send a letter to the Treasury Department seeking assurances that OFAC would 
not launch prosecutions or asset freezes against any government employees providing humanitarian relief.”  
Id. at 403 (internal citations omitted). Executive Order 13,244 was a post September 11, 2001 order 
directed at helping disrupt the financing of international terrorism, and that “authorizes the U.S. 
government to block the assets of individuals and entities that provide support, services, or assistance to, or 
otherwise associate with, terrorists and terrorist organizations designated under the Order, as well as their 
subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.” Exec. Order. No. 13,244, 3 C.F.R.§13244 (2001), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2002-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2002-title3-vol1-eo13224.pdf. 
186 SAFER Act of 2003, H.R. 3522. 
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involved. Absent a clearly defined or definable basis for determining what constitutes 
“our national security interests” for loss of citizenship purposes, this aspect of the SAFER 
Act could struggle against legal challenges such as a charge of unconstitutional 
vagueness.187   
An interesting aspect of the SAFER Act was the proposed amendment to INA § 
349(b). That amendment would have established a statutory presumption regarding 
intent, pursuant to which “serving in the armed forces of a foreign state…engaged in 
hostilities against the United States,” or “joining or serving in, or providing material 
support” to a designated terrorist organization would constitute “prima facie evidence” of 
intention to relinquish citizenship.188 Prima facie evidence is evidence “sufficient to 
establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted.”189  No statutory 
presumption presently exists regarding intent as it relates to loss of citizenship, although 
the U.S. Department of State has adopted an administrative presumption applicable to 
some expatriating acts.190   
It is notable that, because the SAFER Act proposed to amend INA § 349(a)(3) as 
a mechanism to implement loss of citizenship consequences, loss would presumably be 
subject to the provisions of INA § 351, “Restrictions on Loss of Nationality.”191  Those 
restrictions include protections for minors, and more importantly prevent loss of 
citizenship under INA § 349(a)(3) from taking place while a person is in the United 
                                                 
187 See generally, Eugene Volokh, “The Void-for-Vagueness/Fair Notice Doctrine and Civil Cases,” 
The Volokh Conspiracy, June 21, 2012, accessed September 11, 2016, http://volokh.com/2012/06/21/the-
void-for-vagueness-fair-notice-doctrine-and-civil-cases/.  
188 SAFER Act of 2003, H.R. 3522. 
189 Wex, s.v. “Prima Facie,” accessed September 11, 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_ 
facie. 
190 Certification of loss of U.S. Nationality, 22 C.F.R. § 50.40(a), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CFR-2010-title22-vol1/pdf/CFR-2010-title22-vol1-sec50-40.pdf.   
191 Immigration and Nationality Act § 351, 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1952)(as amended).  
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States.192  The SAFER Act does, however, have the potential to create stateless ex-
citizens overseas, which has been and remains a potential outcome from other loss of 
citizenship provisions under U.S. law.  
b. Viability of the SAFER Act and Conclusions 
The SAFER Act was not likely a viable bill, owing to the constitutional questions 
raised by its’ proposed disparate treatment of naturalized and natural born citizens, and 
the predictable and practical difficulties applying vague and broadly worded criteria like 
U.S. “national security interests” in the context of the administration of a loss of 
citizenship statute. Creating the kind of two-tiered citizenship system that the Supreme 
Court rejected in Schneider v. Rusk would likely have doomed this bill.193  In a similar 
way, by tying loss of citizenship to vague concepts such as our “national security 
interests,” the SAFER Act strayed from the clearly enumerated expatriating acts that are a 
consistent aspect of U.S. loss of citizenship law under INA § 349(a), and attempted to 
incorporate something closer to a qualitative standard that would be difficult to 
implement, and that raises question about notice and intent. There is no list or description 
of U.S. national security interests, or of organizations presently acting contrary those 
interests. It thus unclear how a person could join or support such an organization with the 
intention of losing citizenship, when the status of the organization as one acting contrary 
to the national security interests of the U.S. may not be known at the time the act was 
committed, and may only be determined based on a post-hoc analysis. 
These problems notwithstanding, the SAFER Act offered some interesting ideas.   
The SAFER Act proposed adding terrorism-related loss of citizenship to U.S. law 
by organizing the bulk of the amendment under INA § 349(a)(3), the section presently 
focused on serving in the armed forces of a foreign nation. Analogizing the decision to 
                                                 
192 “Except as provided in paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 349(a) of this title, no national of the 
United States can lose United States nationality under this Act while within the United States or any of its 
outlying possessions, but loss of nationality shall result from the performance within the United States or 
any of its outlying possessions of any of the acts or the fulfillment of any of the conditions specified in this 
chapter if and when the national thereafter takes up a residence outside the United States and its outlying 
possessions.” Ibid. 
193 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
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join or support a terrorist organization to the decision to join or support the armed forces 
of a foreign nation, particularly one hostile to the United States, was a sensible and 
predictable approach.   
The SAFER Act proposed at least one novel concept, involving the creation of a 
statutory presumption regarding intent. Intent is a key analytical point for loss of 
citizenship, as the federal government is no longer empowered to involuntarily strip 
citizenship from citizens. When a citizen commits a statutory expatriating act, he or she 
must do so voluntarily and with the intention of losing citizenship. The Supreme Court 
has indicated that intent can be determined from “words or … found as a fair inference 
from proved conduct.”194 Absent an express statement to the contrary, government 
adjudicators considering possible terrorism-related loss of citizenship cases will likely 
face assertions by citizens that they did not intend to lose their U.S. citizenship in the 
context of joining or supporting a terrorist cause or organization. To reach a loss of 
citizenship determination over such objection, it may be necessary to infer intent from the 
expatriating act or acts alleged to have been committed. Inferring intent on a case-by-case 
basis may prove challenging, both in the context of the adjudication itself, and defending 
that adjudication against a legal challenge. By establishing a statutory presumption 
regarding intent, Congress would put the public on notice regarding the consequences of 
engaging in particular potentially expatriating acts, while simultaneously conveying both 
to adjudicators and federal courts how terrorism-related loss of citizenship was intended 
to be applied, facilitating implementation and review. By including a statutory 
presumption regarding intent, the SAFER Act suggests an innovation that could be one 
key to unlocking the problem of how the federal government might remain compliant 
with existing voluntariness and intent mandates under law, while at the same time having 
a genuine opportunity to create a workable terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
mechanism. A similar presumption was incorporated into Australia’s new loss of 
citizenship law,195 and may prove an attractive provision for future U.S. legislators to 
consider when drafting legislation.   
                                                 
194 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 242 (1980) 
195 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015. 
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A final note on the creation of stateless ex-citizens. Although the SAFER Act 
doesn’t present an opportunity for loss of citizenship to take place regarding individuals 
in the United States, owing to its organization under INA § 349(a)(3) and the limitations 
imposed by INA § 351, it does suffer from a problem common to U.S. loss of citizenship 
law generally, which is the potential for creation of stateless ex-citizens overseas. A U.S. 
citizen overseas who also possesses citizenship of another nation could, following loss of 
U.S. citizenship, effectively be prevented from returning to the United States. However, 
an individual overseas who is rendered stateless following loss of U.S. citizenship may 
nevertheless be returned to the U.S. under some circumstances.196  From a homeland 
security perspective, it is unclear what benefit flows from a law that withdraws U.S. 
citizenship from an overseas citizen on the basis of joining a terrorist organization or 
supporting terrorism, when that individual could nevertheless be returned to the U.S.  
2. The Terrorist Expatriation Act 
On May 6, 2010, Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut introduced in the U.S. 
Senate S. 3327, the Terrorist Expatriation Act. Simultaneously, Representative Jason 
Altmire of Pennsylvania introduced an identical bill, H.R. 5237, in the House of 
                                                 
196 Loss of “American nationality does not necessarily prevent a former national’s deportation from a 
foreign country to the United States as an alien.”  “Renunciation of U.S. Nationality by Persons Claiming a 
Right of Residence in the United States,” U.S. Department of State, accessed September 11, 2016, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/renunciation-of-
citizenship-right-of-residence.html. See also, Kim Boatman, “A Man Without A Country, Literally – Ex-
U.S. Citizen Has Become A Drifter Among Nations,” The Seattle Times, November 27, 1992, accessed 
September 11, 2016, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19921127&slug= 
1526849.   
“In 1979, Paul Weis pointed out the potential illegality to which deprivation of citizenship may give 
rise, particularly where, ‘it affects the right of other States to demand from the State of nationality the 
readmission of its nationals...[I]ts extraterritorial effect would be denied as regards the duty of admission. 
He distinguishes between denationalization before leaving and denationalisation after leaving the State of 
nationality, but is of the view that in both cases, the duty to permit residence or to readmit the former 
national persists, and is further supported in the latter case: ‘The good faith of a State which has admitted 
an alien on the assumption that the State of his nationality is under an obligation to receive him back would 
be deceived if by subsequent denationalisation this duty were to be extinguished.’ These propositions are 
unexceptional as a matter of international law. As Judge Read remarked in the Nottebohm case, when a 
non-citizen appears at the border, the State has an right to refuse admission. If, however, it allows the non-
citizen to enter, then it brings into being a series of legal relationships with the State of which he or she is a 
national, which status will be commonly evidenced by production of a passport. This relative relationship 
of rights and duties is the source of the receiving State’s right to terminate the non-citizen’s stay by 
deporting him or her to the State which issued the passport (‘returnability’ being central to the passport 
regime), and of the State of nationality’s obligation to admit its citizens expelled from other States.” Guy S. 
Goodman-Gill, “Mr. Al-Jedda, Deprivation of Citizenship, and International Law.”  
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Representatives.197  The Terrorist Expatriation Act proposed a different loss of 
citizenship mechanism than Rep. Barrett’s SAFER Act. Representative Barrett’s SAFER 
Act was formally a proposal to amend INA § 349(a)(3), regarding service in the armed 
forces of a foreign state, and which included the novel legal mechanism of creating a 
statutory presumption regarding intent to lose United States citizenship. The Terrorist 
Expatriation Act proposed amending INA § 349(a) by adding a new subparagraph 8. The 
new subparagraph would have provided for loss of citizenship as a result of: 
(A) providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization; 
(B) engaging in, or purposefully and materially supporting, hostilities against the 
United States; or 
(C) engaging in, or purposefully and materially supporting, hostilities against any 
country or armed force that is— 
(i) directly engaged along with the United States in hostilities engaged in 
by the United States; or 
(ii) providing direct operational support to the United States in hostilities 
engaged in by the United States.198 
a. Analysis and Issues under U.S. Law 
Like the SAFER Act, the Terrorist Expatriation Act proposed concepts new to 
U.S. loss of citizenship law. But unlike the SAFER Act, the Terrorist Expatriation Act 
was directed at a much broader scope of potentially expatriating terrorism-related 
conduct, extending the possibility of loss for individuals engaging in or materially 
supporting “hostilities” against the United States or our military allies.199  The Terrorist 
Expatriation Act presumably adopted the concept of “hostilities against the United 
States” from INA § 349(a)(3)(A), but uses it in a different context. INA § 349(a)(3)(A) 
establishes as an expatriating act, joining the “armed forces of a foreign state” if those 
forces are “engaged in hostilities against the United States.”  Under 349(a)(3)(A) the 
“hostilities” clause modifies the meaning of “armed forces of a foreign state.”  The 
                                                 
197 Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Congress (2010), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/111/s3327; Terrorist Expatriation Act, H.R. 5237, 111th Congress (2010), https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/111/hr5237. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Although not expressly referenced, the term “foreign terrorist organization” presumably refers to 
the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list maintained by the U.S. Department of State.  “Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed September 11, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/
ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.  
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proposed Terrorist Expatriation Act bill shifts the focus from membership in a hostile 
state’s armed forces, to simply engaging in or materially supporting hostilities against the 
United States or our key military allies. Although not referenced in the law, this usage 
appears likely to have been drawn from the U.S. Manual for Military Commissions, 
which was created to facilitate “the full and fair prosecution of alien unlawful enemy 
combatants by military commissions.”200  The 2007 version of the manual defines an 
“Unlawful Enemy Combatant” as “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents…”201  Neither the Terrorist Expatriation Act, nor the Manual for Military 
Commissions defines the term “hostilities.”202 
The potential scope of the Terrorist Expatriation Act could include actions taken 
overseas, or actions taken domestically. Further, it is not limited to actions supporting 
foreign terrorist organizations, and thus presumably could encompass actions taken in 
furtherance of domestic terrorism, or other actions determined to constitute “hostilities” 
against the United States or our allies. Domestic terrorist movements and organizations 
exist in the United States.203  For example, groups like the Animal Liberation Front and 
                                                 
200 Manual for Military Commissions, Department of Defense, January 18, 2007, accessed September 
11, 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/The%20Manual%20for%20Military% 20Commissions.pdf.  
201 Manual for Military Commissions, Department of Defense, Rule 103(a)(24). A “lawful enemy 
combatant” is defined in manual in part as “a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in 
hostilities against the United States…,” broadly corresponding to a person to whom INA §349(a)(3)(A) 
would apply.   The manual was updated in 2010 and 2012, changing the term “Unlawful Enemy 
Combatant” to “Unprivileged Enemy Belligerent,” but the definition remained largely unchanged.   
202 “Hostilities” is defined in the Military Commissions Act. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9)(2006)(“ The term 
“hostilities” means any conflict subject to the laws of war.”) 
203 The Department of Justice has provided the following presumably non-exhaustive list of domestic 
terror threats in the United States, which include: “animal rights extremists, eco-terrorists, anarchists, 
antigovernment extremists such as “sovereign citizens” and unauthorized militias, Black separatists, White 
supremacists, anti-abortion extremists, and other unaffiliated disaffected Americans, including “lone 
wolfs.” Domestic terrorism cases often involve firearms, arson or explosive offenses, crimes relating to 
fraud, and threats and hoaxes.”  “Domestic Terrorism,” Office of the United States Attorneys, last updated 
December 8, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/national-security/domestic-terrorism. See 
also, “Sovereign Citizens A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, September 2011, https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/ sovereign-citizens-a-growing-
domestic-threat-to-law-enforcement.  
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Earth Liberation Front were active in the United States primarily in the 1990s and early 
to mid-2000s.204   
Finally, as proposed, the Terrorist Expatriation Act has the potential to create 
stateless ex-citizens in foreign nations, as well as within the United States.  
b. Viability of the Terrorist Expatriation Act and Conclusions 
The bulk of the Terrorist Expatriation Act was likely not viable, owing to its’ 
reliance on the term “hostilities” as a key analytical point; however, standing alone, the 
proposed new section 8(A), which would have made loss of citizenship a potential 
consequence of for “providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization” could have been viable.   
Some commentators asserted that the Terrorist Expatriation Act was an 
unconstitutional effort to strip “people of citizenship for joining terrorist 
organizations…”205  Others, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, suggested that 
the bill might have merit.206  The viability of this and any other terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship proposal would certainly hinge on its ability to be implemented in a manner 
consistent with constitutional and existing statutory restrictions. Stripping someone of 
citizenship implies unintended involuntary loss of citizenship, which is not possible under 
U.S. law. U.S. law permits loss of citizenship to occur only when an individual 
voluntarily undertakes a statutory expatriating act with the intention of losing 
citizenship.207  Voluntariness is presumed under U.S. law (subject to rebuttal), but intent 
requires proof based upon a preponderance of the evidence.208  The Supreme Court has 
                                                 
204 “Testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,” 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 18, 2004, accessed September 11, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/news/ 
testimony/animal-rights-extremism-and-ecoterrorism.  
205 Charlie Savage and Carl Hulse, “Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists’ Allies,” New York Times, 
May 6, 2010, accessed September 11, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/07rights.html? 
_r=0. 
206 Ibid. 
207Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952)(as amended); Afroyim v. Rusk, 
387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980). 
208 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1952)(as amended); Afroyim v. Rusk, 
387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980). 
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previously held that intent in the context of an expatriating act can be determined, in part, 
“as a fair inference from proved conduct.”209  Thus, hypothetically, had this bill been 
passed into law, or at least section 8(A), an administrative agency considering a loss of 
citizenship case resulting from an individual providing material support to a terrorist 
organization could lawfully presume that such an individual acted voluntarily (subject to 
rebuttal). In addition, it is conceivable that a fair inference drawn from specific acts of 
material support to a terrorist organization could support the conclusion that the 
individual had acted with the intention of losing his or her U.S. citizenship. Under such 
circumstances, administration of section 8(A) of the bill could have occurred consistent 
with existing legal requirements and restrictions, and would not fairly be characterized as 
“stripping” someone of their citizenship. 
The incorporation of “material support” as an expatriating act poses some 
potential problems, but inasmuch as providing “material support” to terrorism or a 
terrorist organization is already a feature of both U.S. criminal law210 and immigration 
law,211 incorporation of that concept into loss of citizenship law is not particularly 
surprising.   
Another potential viability concern with the Terrorist Expatriation Act arises from 
the possible association of this bill with efforts to expand use of military commissions. 
Following the passage of the Military Commission Act of 2006, and in conjunction with 
the Military Commissions Manual, it appears that this bill may have been formulated to 
provide an opportunity for U.S. citizens captured on the battlefield, or elsewhere, to lose 
their citizenship and then be subjected to trial by a military commission, rather than trail 
before a Federal Court in the United States.212  Initiating an administrative loss of 
citizenship proceeding under such circumstances could have been characterized as an 
                                                 
209 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 242 (1980). 
210 Providing Material Support to Terrorists, 18 U.S.C., § 2339A (1994)(as amended); Providing 
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 18 U.S.C., § 2339B 
(1996)(as amended). 
211 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1952)(as amended). See also 
“Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  
212 Peter J. Spiro, “Expatriating Terrorists,” Fordham Law Review 82 (2014): 2175 fn. 45.    
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effort to deprive U.S. citizens of important rights at the very moment when those rights 
were most critical to the individual, and most inconvenient to the federal government. 
This brings to mind echoes of the coercive renunciation process initiated in the 1940s for 
compulsorily interned U.S. citizens having Japanese heritage. Had the Terrorist 
Expatriation Act been implemented in this manner, it could have proved extraordinarily 
controversial. 
In addition, the scope of proposed section 8(B) of this bill regarding acts “of 
hostility against the United States,” does not preclude application to domestic acts. 
Consider the Oklahoma City bombing, which involved the destruction of a federal 
building and the killing of 168 people, motivated by antipathy toward the Federal 
Government following the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents. That bombing could be 
characterized as an act of hostility against the United States. As a consequence, the 
bombers were tried and convicted, and in the case of Timothy McVeigh, executed. It is 
hard to identify what purpose would be furthered by adding loss of citizenship to the 
consequences of domestic terror acts committed by Americans, and for which appropriate 
criminal process is available. 
The Terrorist Expatriation Act also creates the possibility that a U.S. citizen could 
lose his or her citizenship and become stateless while in the United States. In addition to 
generally acknowledged humanitarian and ethical concerns associated with creating 
stateless people,213 the practical problems associated with creating stateless ex-citizens in 
the United States suggest good policy reasons why that outcome should be avoided. For 
purposes of addressing problems related to terrorism, creating stateless ex-citizens in the 
United States is no solution at all. An individual who loses his or her U.S. citizenship 
becomes an alien with regard to the United States.214  If rendered stateless while in the 
United States, such an individual would be functionally trapped in the United States. 
                                                 
213 “Statelessness,” U.S. Department of State, accessed September 11, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/
prm/policyissues/issues/c50242.htm. “Ending Statelessness,” UNHCR, accessed September 11, 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/stateless-people.html.  
214 “[T]he individual will be ineligible to receive a U.S. passport in the future unless he or she, like 
any other alien, subsequently naturalizes in the future as a U.S. citizen.” “Renunciation of U.S. Nationality 
by Persons Claiming a Right to Residence in the United States,” U.S. Department of State.   
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Lacking a passport or eligibility for an official U.S. travel document, a stateless ex-citizen 
in the United States would find it difficult or impossible to leave the United States, or 
gain admission to any foreign nation. Likewise, administrative removal proceedings 
would prove ineffective as it would be functionally impossible to successfully designate a 
country of removal.215  If convicted of a crime, such an individual could be criminally 
incarcerated, but upon completion of that sentence would be subject to release. He or she 
could not be perpetually detained by the U.S. government as an immigration matter if 
removal proved impossible.216  The result would be a stateless ex-citizen in the United 
States who, although formally an alien under U.S. law, cannot be removed from the 
United States. He or she would be ineligible to work absent work authorization, and 
would become a perpetual burden on state and federal administrative resources, while 
remaining at large and capable of continuing to engage in or support the terrorist groups 
or causes that formed the basis of his or her loss of citizenship in the first place. Loss of 
citizenship under such circumstances would be symbolic, but provides no evident 
homeland security benefit.  
3. The Enemy Expatriation Act of 2011 
Senator Lieberman and a new joint sponsor, Representative Charles Dent from the 
House of Representatives, introduced the Enemy Expatriation Act in October of 2011.217 
The Enemy Expatriation Act was essentially a stripped down version of the Terrorist 
Expatriation Act, but with a new twist. Like its predecessor, this bill also proposed the 
addition of a new subparagraph 8 to INA § 349(a), but it this instance expatriation was a 
consequence for:  
 
(8) engaging in, or purposefully and materially supporting, hostilities against the 
United States. 
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In addition, the bill proposed a new subparagraph (c) to section 349 of the INA, 
which defined the statutory term “hostilities” as follows: 
 
(c) For purposes of this section, the term hostilities means any conflict subject to 
the laws of war. 
 
a. Analysis and Issues Under U.S. Law 
This revised and streamlined version of the previously-proposed Terrorist 
Expatriation Act makes several significant changes. Viewed from the perspective of its 
predecessor, this version eliminates the previously-proposed 349(a)(8)(A) and 
349(a)(8)(C) from the Terrorist Expatriation Act, reintroducing the previously-proposed 
349(a)(8)(B) as a stand-alone bill. 
Unlike INA §§ 349(a)(1)-(7), the Enemy Expatriation Act does not focus on a 
specified or enumerated act, or in the case of treason, conviction for a specified heinous 
crime. Instead, it makes loss of citizenship a product of a qualitative analysis of the 
potentially expatriating act. Under the Enemy Expatriation Act, an individual must 
voluntarily, and with the intent to lose U.S. citizenship, engage in an act or acts 
constituting hostilities against the U.S., or engage in acts constituting the provision of 
material support to hostilities against the U.S., before he or she could be deemed to have 
lost U.S. citizenship under this proposed bill.   
The Enemy Expatriation Act attempts to add clarity to the analysis by defining the 
term “hostilities” as “any conflict subject to the laws of war.”218  It is notable that the 
term “hostilities” appears both in the proposed new subsection (8), and also in subsection 
(3) regarding service in the armed forces of a foreign state. With regard to the proposed 
new subsection (8), based on the proposed definition of the term “hostilities,” it could 
alternately be read as follows: 
 
(8) engaging in, or purposefully and materially supporting, [any conflict subject to 
the laws of war] against the United States. 
 
                                                 
218 Ibid. 
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As proposed, this bill has the potential to create stateless ex-citizens in foreign 
nations, as well as within the United States.   
Commentators have argued that this bill is likely unconstitutional as an effort to 
involuntarily strip Americans of their citizenship;219 however, on its face, this bill does 
not in fact change or affect predicate statutory requirements under INA §349(a) or the 
Supreme Court precedent from which those requirements were drawn. If this bill were 
passed into law, it could only be applied in the context of voluntary acts committed by a 
U.S. citizen, and by which acts the citizen intended to lose his or her citizenship. As with 
the Terrorist Expatriation Act, implementation of this bill consistent with current 
constitutional restrictions would likely require use of inferred intent. Any such effort 
would surely generate intense scrutiny and legal challenges, but those predictable 
outcomes do not mean that the bill is necessarily unconstitutional. While this bill might 
be challenging to administer, both administratively and legally, and may have policy 
implications that affect the viability of the bill, the text of the bill is not inherently 
unconstitutional. It could be applied unconstitutionally, but that is a possibility that could 
only be tested in the event it was passed into law.  
b. Viability of the Enemy Expatriation Act and Conclusions 
The Enemy Expatriation Act is problematic for several reasons, and is not likely 
viable. It suffers from previously referenced problems associated with allowing loss of 
citizenship to take place while an individual is in the United States, creating stateless ex-
citizens in general, as well as the challenges associated with using “material support” as a 
basis for loss of citizenship. The Enemy Expatriation Act also presents the novel problem 
of tying loss of citizenship to the laws of war. Further, changes that occurred as between 
this bill and its predecessor, the Terrorist Expatriation Act, provide additional support for 
                                                 
219 “Devon Chaffee, a legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, said the proposed 
amendment could theoretically be used to circumvent current laws, including the NDAA. If the amendment 
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hostilities against the U.S., thereby subjecting him or her to the indefinite military detention provision of 
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the notion that the bill was intended to be complimentary with matters triable by Military 
Commissions.   
Under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, “[a] military commission has 
jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by the [Military Commissions Act] or the 
law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on or after 
September 11, 2001.”220  The Military Commissions Act defines the term “hostilities” 
identically to the Enemy Expatriation Act.221  As previously noted, if implemented, this 
provision would prove controversial, as at a time when rights are most important, it 
appears directed at potentially withdrawing those rights, including rights that would 
otherwise entitle a U.S. citizen to different trial procedures, and would exclude the 
individual from coverage under the Geneva Convention.222  The “laws of war” are not a 
document or source. They are a collection of treaties and international law sources 
demanding extensive review and analysis to understand and apply in particular situations. 
The Department of Defense produces a document called the Law of War Manual.223  At 
more than 1200 pages, the manual is too extensive to summarize here; however, this 
passage from the introduction provides an idea of what application Enemy Expatriation 
Act might entail. The Law of War Manual states: “For the purposes of this manual, the 
law of war is that part of international law that regulates the resort to armed force; the 
conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both international and non-
                                                 
220 Jennifer K. Elsea, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and 
Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (CRS Report No. 
RL33688)(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 27, 2007), https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/ RL33688.pdf. The Military Commissions Act has since been amended such that the term 
“alien unlawful enemy combatant” is now “Unprivileged enemy belligerent.”  10 U.S.C. § 
948(a)(7)(2006)(as amended).   
221 “The term ‘hostilities’ means any conflict subject to the laws of war.” 10 U.S.C. § 
948a(9)(2006)(as amended). 
222 10 U.S.C. § 948(b)(e)(2006)(as amended)(“No alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to 
trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for a private 
right of action.”) See also, John B. Bellinger III, “Obama, Bush, and the Geneva Conventions,” Foreign 
Policy, August 11, 2010, accessed September 11, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/08/11/obama-bush-
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223 Department of Defense Law of War Manual, Department of Defense Office of the General 
Counsel (June 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ Law-of-War-Manual-June-
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international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between 
belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States.”224 
The U.S. Army’s Judge Advocate General also produces a manual called the Law 
of Armed Conflict Deskbook, which is a bit more succinct at 260 pages.225 A brief 
review of these resources suggests associating the application of a civil expatriation 
provision with the law of war would be challenging. To begin with, there is no list of 
conflicts to which the “laws of war” apply. Conflicts subject to the laws of war are 
measured not by reference to a list, but rather by analysis of an event against a set of 
international standards.226 In some instances, identifying a conflict to which the laws of 
war would apply may not be difficult. The clearest example is a formally declared 
war. 227 However, Congress hasn’t declared war since World War II. Modern conflicts 
frequently involve non-state actors. At times they involve individuals engaging in 
individual acts of violence in the name of a terrorist organization or movement, but which 
actions were not expressly directed or planned by that organization. Instead, they may 
reflect an expression of solidarity with the organization’s message, or perhaps a response 
to a published general call for violence. The unique aspects of modern violence make 
tying the application of this proposed expatriation legislation to an administrative 
interpretation of the laws of war particularly challenging.   
This Enemy Expatriation Act also presents the serious potential of creating 
conflicts within the executive branch and the federal government itself. Administration of 
the expatriation provisions in the U.S. code falls primarily to the Department of State and 
in rare instances to the Department of Homeland Security. Rarer still is the involvement 
of military courts martial and the federal court system, which in the first instance only 
exercise expatriating authority in the extraordinarily rare instance of treason. In order to 
                                                 
224 Department of Defense Law of War Manual, Office of the General Counsel, Department of 
Defense. 
225 International and Operational Law Department, United States Army Judge Advocate General’s 
Legal Center and School, Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook (Charlottesville, VA: 2013). 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2013.pdf.   
226 Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook, International and Operational Law Department, United States 
Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, pg. 23–28.  
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administer the proposed subparagraph 8 amendment to INA § 349(a), a component of the 
executive branch of the United States government would have to assess whether an 
individual engaged in, or materially supported a conflict subject to the laws of war. That 
would likely fall to the Department of State for individuals overseas, and possibly to the 
Department of Homeland Security for individuals within the United States.   
Absent clear guidance within the statute itself, the appropriate agency would be 
required to conduct an analysis of the event in question and reach a conclusion regarding 
the application of the laws of war. This analysis might conflict with the interpretation of 
those same events by the Department of Defense. Such a potential conflict could render 
this proposed provision entirely unworkable from an administrative standpoint. The 
Department of Defense would likely balk at the Department of State or Department of 
Homeland Security interpreting the laws of war in a civil context, particularly if that 
interpretation runs counter to its own assessment. Coordinating those decisions, in light 
of the possible connection to trying such an individual by a Military Commission 
presents further potential conflict. In addition, there is the potential that a body of 
decisional law could arise regarding application of the laws of war in a civil context that 
might challenge the Department of Defense’s consistent interpretation and application of 
international law.   
For all of these reasons, the Enemy Expatriation act would not likely prove 
successful.  
4. The Expatriate Terrorists Act of 2014 and Expatriate Terrorist Act of 
2015 
In 2014, during the 113th Congress, Senator Ted Cruz and Representative Edward 
Royce introduced the Expatriate Terrorists Act to the Senate and House of 
Representatives.228 This act proposed a variety of amendments to INA § 349(a) 
consistent with the goal of establishing an expatriation consequence related to terrorism 
and terrorist acts. INA § 349(a)(2), which provides for possible loss of nationality for 
                                                 
228 Expatriate Terrorists Act, S. 2779, 113th Congress (2014), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
113/s2779; Expatriate Terrorists Act, H.R. 5450, 113th Congress (2014), https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/113/hr5450. 
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“taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof,” would be amended by adding “or a 
designated foreign terrorist organization.”229  In addition, INA § 349(a)(3), which 
imposes a potential loss of citizenship consequence for service in the armed forces of a 
foreign state, would be amended to include service in the armed forces of a foreign 
terrorist organization.  
Further, a new subparagraph 4 was proposed, which would provide for possible 
loss of citizenship for: 
(4)  becoming a member of, or providing training or material assistance to, any 
designated foreign terrorist organization that such person knows, or has reason to 
know— 
(A) will engage in hostilities against the United States; or 
(B) will commit acts of terror against the United States or nationals of the 
United States.230 
 
In 2015 a revised and updated version of the bill, now the Expatriate Terrorist Act 
was offered.231  The updated version provided additional changes, which included 
clarification regarding the meaning of a key term in the bill. It defined the term foreign 
terrorist organization by reference to INA § 219.232  It also proposed further 
modifications to current INA § 349(a)(4)(which would become INA § 349(a)(5) under 
the Expatriate Terrorist Act scheme), making it a potentially expatriating act to accept, 
serve in, or otherwise be employed by a foreign terrorist organization.233   
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a. Analysis and Issues under U.S. Law 
These bills proposed creating a potential loss of citizenship consequence for acts 
related to joining or supporting a foreign terrorist organization. Similar to the SAFER 
Act, they proposed to amend INA § 349(a)(3) to include fighting in the armed forces of a 
designated terrorist organization, but also proposed further consistent changes for 
swearing an oath to, becoming a member of, or providing training or material support to a 
designated foreign terrorist organization, and in the 2015 version, being employed by a 
foreign terrorist organization.   
From an administrative standpoint these proposed amendments are consistent 
with existing provisions under INA § 349(a), in that they enumerate specific acts, rather 
than relying on a qualitative assessment of generalized action. Act-based provisions 
facilitate notice to individuals by making it easier to understand when one is 
contemplating or committing a potentially expatriating act. They also simplify 
adjudication, and make decisions more likely to withstand scrutiny, as adjudication relies 
less on administrative judgment and focuses more on objective evidence. The proposed 
new INA § 349(a)(4), however, is subject to previously-discussed concerns associated 
with relying on material support as a potential loss of citizenship criterion. 
One aspect of the Expatriate Terrorist Act that merits additional discussion is the 
fact that it proposes the addition of a new INA § 349(a) subsection, increasing the total 
number from 7 to 8, but it did not propose changes to INA § 351, which imposes 
restrictions on the loss of citizenship consequence flowing from INA § 349(a)(1)-(6).234 
Under current law, INA § 351 prevents loss of citizenship from taking effect under INA § 
349(a)(1)-(6) until the individual takes up residence in a foreign nation. Absent an 
express amendment to INA § 351, it is unlikely the proposed new INA § 349(a)(4) would 
be included within that restrictive provision of INA § 351. Rather, a technical amendment 
would likely be necessary, adjusting INA § 351 to reflect that, under the amended law, its 
restrictions would apply to loss of citizenship under INA § 349(a)(1)-(3), and (5)-(6). 
But, as amended, INA §§ 349(a)(2), (a)(3), and the current (a)(4)(which would become 
                                                 
234 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 351, 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1952)(as amended).  
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(a)(5)) would likely remain subject to the INA § 351 restrictions. This would create a 
curious consequence. Any loss of citizenship resulting from swearing an oath to a foreign 
terrorist organization (§ 349(a)(2) as amended) or serving in the armed forces of foreign 
terrorist organization (§ 349(a)(3) as amended), or being employed by a foreign terrorist 
organization (§ 349(a)(5) as amended)) would not occur until the individual takes up 
residence in a foreign nation; however, joining, or providing training or material support 
to a foreign terrorist organization (§ 349(a)(4) as amended) could result in loss of 
citizenship taking effect regardless of whether the individual is in the United States or 
elsewhere.  
b. Viability of the Expatriate Terrorist(s) Act and Conclusions 
The loss of citizenship provisions of the Expatriate Terrorist Act present many of 
the same viability issues as the other bills reviewed in this chapter, although in this 
instance, the concerns and primarily procedural. The bill does not appear, on its face, to 
have any provisions that could not be constitutionally implemented. As with the other 
legislative efforts reviewed, the Expatriate Terrorist Act would likely require reliance on 
inferred intent to be effective. The bill proposes a variety of different complimentary 
amendments, all of which are consistent with the bill’s goal of establishing a potential 
loss of citizenship consequence for joining or supporting a foreign terrorist organization, 
but as written it creates the possibility for strange and seemingly contradictory outcomes. 
Under this bill, domestic loss of citizenship is not possible for individuals who serve in 
the armed forces of, are employed by, or swear an oath to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization; however, domestic loss of citizenship is possible for individuals who join, 
or provide training or material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 
Where domestic criminal law provides a sufficient means of addressing domestic terror 
crimes, there is no clear benefit to creating a possible domestic loss of citizenship 
consequence. In fact, some groups, such as sovereign citizens, might seize on that aspect 
of the law as an opportunity to divest themselves of U.S. citizenship, in furtherance of 
their world view.   
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As previously noted, U.S. law currently contains no express prohibition or 
established policy or procedural mechanism preventing the creation of stateless ex-
citizens, but as a matter of policy and for practical purposes related to proper 
administration of the law, legislators should be wary of that outcome, particularly where 
a bill has the possibility of creating stateless ex-citizens within the United States. For this 
reason, the proposed new INA § 349(a)(4), which is likely not affected by the restrictions 
of INA § 351, is problematic. 
The differing application INA § 351 in the context of this bill was likely 
accidental, deriving from an incomplete review of the law, or understanding of its 
consequences. There is no other rational explanation for why INA § 351 would be left 
presumptively applicable to some provisions of this bill and not others. To reduce 
problems associated with creating stateless ex-citizens, legislators should consider, at a 
minimum, including all new terrorism-related loss of citizenship provisions under the 
restrictive provisions of INA § 351, preventing loss of citizenship from taking place 
while an individual is in the United States. Legislators might also consider making 
terrorism-related loss of citizenship not applicable to individuals who would be rendered 
stateless. 
5. The Enemy Expatriation Act of 2015 — Version A and B 
Representative Charles Dent of Pennsylvania submitted two separate versions of 
his Enemy Expatriation Act in 2015.235  The first version, H.R. 545, appears identical to 
H.R. 3166, the bill he submitted in 2011. This version and its 2011 twin tie the term 
“hostilities” to the laws of war. The second 2015 version, H.R. 4168, discards reference 
to the laws of war, creating a potential loss of citizenship consequence for, “traveling 
abroad to join, participate in, train with, fight for, conspire with, or otherwise support a 
foreign terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State under section 219.”236   
                                                 
235 Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 545, 114th Congress (2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/114/hr545; Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 4186, 114th Congress (2015), https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/114/hr4186.   
236 Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 4186.  
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a. Analysis and Issues under U.S. Law 
Representative Dent’s initial offering in 2015 was identical to his 2011 bill, and is 
subject to the same analysis as that bill. The revised 2015 bill is similarly structured as an 
amendment to INA § 349(a), adding a new section 8. However, the revised section 8 
changes its focus in a way that is similar to, and was perhaps influenced by the Expatriate 
Terrorist Act. The new version creates a loss of citizenship consequence for leaving the 
United States for the purpose of associating with a designated foreign terrorist 
organization (“traveling abroad to join, participate in, train with, fight for, conspire with, 
or otherwise support a foreign terrorist organization”). Interestingly, it also proposes a 
corresponding amendment to INA § 351, expressly excluding the new section 8 from the 
restrictions applicable to INA § 349(a)(1)-(5). Unlike prior proposals which left questions 
about whether sponsors considered the issue of domestic and overseas effect for loss of 
citizenship, in this instance it appears Representative Dent intended the possibility that 
loss of citizenship under his bill could affect individuals in the United States.   
As with other formulations considered, this bill would likely rely on the use of 
inferred intent in the context of adjudicating loss of citizenship in most instances. 
b. Viability of the Enemy Expatriation Act of 2015 
The revised Enemy Expatriation Act submitted at the close of 2015 is consistent 
with other submissions in its focus and mechanisms, and suffers from common 
shortcomings. While viable in the sense that the bill could be constitutionally applied, it 
is nevertheless problematic. The possibility of creating stateless ex-citizens in the United 
States was intentionally included in this bill for reasons that remain unclear, particularly 
considering the bill’s focus on acts that require “traveling abroad...”237  Creating stateless 
ex-citizens in the United States holds no evident homeland security benefit, and instead 
creates a host of potential burdens and problems for federal and state authorities. The 
possibility of creating stateless ex-citizens overseas, although also problematic, is perhaps 
more understandable and less concerning where such individuals have voluntarily 
departed the United States, taken up residence overseas, and in this instances committed 
                                                 
237 Ibid. 
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themselves to an overseas terrorist organization or cause. Even if the United States could, 
in some instances, be forced to accept repatriation of such individuals based on 
diplomatic pressure or agreements regarding the return of stateless individuals from allied 
nations to the country of their birth or last citizenship, such instances would likely be 
rare. Until repatriation was requested, such individuals would be forced to remain outside 
of the United States, providing a plausible homeland security benefit.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The reinvigoration of interest in withdrawing citizenship from U.S. citizens based 
on their participation in terrorism in the post 9/11 world raises interesting questions about 
the very meaning of citizenship. Our national identity has historically been synonymous 
with immigration and the promise of a better life. In the introduction to John F. 
Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants, his brother Senator Edward Kennedy wrote 
“Immigrants today come from all corners of the world, representing every race and creed. 
They work hard. They practice their faith. They love their families. And they love this 
country. We would not be a great nation today without them. But whether we remain true 
to that history and heritage is a major challenge.”238  
Our current loss of citizenship regime emerged from the crucible of the post-
World War II era, and the legislative reforms and constitutional protections that resulted. 
In the U.S. today, citizenship, once properly acquired, is difficult to assail. In almost all 
situations, the only question the government can ask regarding loss of citizenship is, do 
you wish to remain a citizen?  The federal government, which previously exercised the 
power to punitively, or at any rate involuntarily withdraw citizenship from citizens has 
been deprived of that authority. But in reviewing loss of nationality legislation in the 
United States in the post-9/11 era, we can see reborn in the U.S. the dormant question, 
“Do you deserve to be a citizen?”   
                                                 
238 John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants, with introduction by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (Harper 
Perennial, Revised ed. 2008). Introduction available online at “A Nation of Immigrants – John F. Kennedy 
– Introduction by Edward M. Kennedy,” Anti-Defamation League Archive website, accessed September 
12, 2016, http://archive.adl.org/immigrants/introemk.html.  
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The revival of this question is likely informed by a variety of issues in addition to 
the perceived threat terrorism poses to the United States. Americans have been 
voluntarily renouncing their citizenship in record numbers. More than 15,000 
renunciations have taken place since 2008.239  This unprecedented voluntary rejection of 
U.S. citizenship has been occurring concurrently with increased concerns relating to core 
immigration issues, including border security, vetting of immigrants, and fear that 
terrorist elements are using our immigration system to infiltrate America.240 It has led 
Congress, and citizens to contemplate the meaning of citizenship. 
There is certainly some tension between the meaning of citizenship under law and 
the contents of, for example, the Oath of Allegiance administered during a U.S. 
naturalization proceeding. The oath begins with the following, “I hereby declare, on oath, 
that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any 
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been 
a subject or citizen…”241  This statement seems definitive, but it isn’t. The United States 
does not prohibit U.S. citizens from being or acquiring citizenship of another nation.242 In 
fact, the U.S. Department of State has adopted an administrative presumption that an 
individual who takes a “routine oath of allegiance” to a foreign nation in the context of 
naturalizing as a citizen of that country, intends to retain U.S. citizenship.243  But 
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conversely, the State Department acknowledges that a U.S. citizen who is also a dual 
national may “owe allegiance to both the United States and the foreign country.”244   
Given the foregoing, the answer to the question, “what does citizenship mean?” 
remains elusive. Does citizenship entail a commitment involving fidelity and loyalty 
which is in the nature of a legally enforceable duty, and which if violated, could cost an 
individual his or her citizenship?  If so, how does that notion of citizenship square with 
the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Trop v. Dulles, which found loss of citizenship 
unconstitutional as a consequence for a member of the armed forces convicted of 
desertion during a time of war?245 
Rather than a duty, is citizenship a “protected legal status”246 that the 
Constitution, and to a lesser extent the Congress (through legislation) and the Executive 
Branch (through administration of the law), confers in the context of granting individuals 
full membership in our society?   
Is it both?  Is it something else?  
To date, Congress has yet to seriously consider terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship legislation. The various bill proposals reviewed in this chapter highlight 
consistent themes, and ultimately demonstrate the difficulty of crafting effective 
legislation to implement loss of nationality consequences related to terrorism. In 
particular, these bills will have difficulty overcoming a key impediment. Existing 
Supreme Court precedent and the present loss of citizenship statute require proof of 
intent. This requirement, and the Supreme Court precedent establishing it, effectively 
means a person cannot lose his or her U.S. citizenship unless he or she intended that 
outcome. Put simply, the federal government cannot involuntarily strip citizenship from a 
U.S. citizen; however, the federal government can make a determination that a U.S. 
                                                 
244 Ibid.  
245 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
246 “Citizenship is not a privilege, but a protected legal status.”  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, opinion 
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citizen voluntary committed a statutory expatriating act, and did so under circumstances 
from which it is reasonable to infer the intention to lose citizenship.   
The public hue and cry about these bills has frequently been wide of the mark. A 
bill is not rendered unconstitutional merely because an unconstitutional application of 
that bill is conceivable. To be sure, some of the terrorism-related loss of citizenship bills 
proposed since 9/11 suffer from constitutional deficits, but others could have been passed 
into law and implemented consistent with U.S. law.   
All of the bills proposed to date, and likely to be proposed in the future, will need 
to rely heavily on inferred-intent for their effective implementation. But bills that make 
no genuine effort to anticipate and address that challenging key analysis are likely to be 
impotent. A review of the of terrorism-related loss of citizenship bills proposed to date 
reveals that they suffer from an array of common problems, including the possibility of 
creating stateless ex-citizens, reliance on concepts or standards that would be difficult or 
impossible to effectively administer, and the failure to consider the domestic, diplomatic, 
and humanitarian consequences. Among those bills, only the SAFER Act offered a 
creative solution to the difficult intent analysis, in the form of a proposed statutory 
presumption regarding intent. 
While legislators and leaders may publically support these bills, it is reasonable to 
conclude that terrorism-related loss of citizenship proposals to date have been largely 
symbolic, as opposed to serious legislative efforts.  
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Using loss of citizenship as a tool to address problems associated with terrorism is 
fraught with a variety of problems. Current Supreme Court precedent recognizes 
constitutional protections that significantly limit the ability of the federal government to 
pass legislation capable of causing U.S. citizens to lose their citizenship, which makes 
drafting and implementing a terrorism-related expatriation bill a challenging proposition. 
Although it is possible, from a drafting perspective, to create a constitutional terrorism-
related loss of citizenship provision, it is unclear how effective such a measure would be. 
Although other tools, such as passport restrictions, may be sufficient to address many 
practical concerns regarding United States citizens joining or supporting terrorism 
overseas, and would likely be easier to implement, loss of citizenship bills continue to be 
submitted to Congress with regularity. The attacks of 9/11 took place during the 107th 
session of Congress. Terrorism-related loss of citizenship legislation has been introduced 
in six of the seven Congressional sessions that followed, including the current 114th 
Congress.   
Legislative offerings to date have failed to merit serious consideration by 
Congress. As a group, they can be characterized as largely symbolic. There may be some 
political hay that can be made from proposing significantly or even fatally challenged 
bills as a means of demonstrating the proponent’s tough position regarding terrorism and 
its supporters. But the proverb about “making hay while the sun shines” is a curious one 
as applied to terrorism-related loss of citizenship efforts to date. The proverb 
recommends capitalizing on advantageous conditions to get something done. Here, it is 
unclear whether legislators’ focus has been on actually achieving legislative change. Bills 
proposed to date, by and large, have been flawed and ill-considered.   
A. THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EFFECT ON LOSS OF 
CITIZENSHIP LAW 
In the modern era, U.S. citizenship, as a legal matter, cannot be properly 
characterized as a relationship between citizen and nation involving a set of duties and 
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obligations, including a duty of allegiance by the citizen to the nation, enforceable 
through loss of citizenship. A citizen is obligated to report income and pay taxes, but the 
failure to do so is punished through civil and criminal penalties—not by loss of 
citizenship. A citizen has a civic duty to participate in the political activities of the nation 
by voting, but there is no sanction for not voting other than the sacrifice of one’s ability 
to help steer the ship of state. A citizen can be compelled to register for compulsory 
military service, but is entitled to avoid combat service by declaring as a matter of 
conscience his opposition to war.247  A citizen who fails to register for selective service 
may face significant penalties, but loss of citizenship is not one of them.248  
Once vested, citizenship is not a privilege subject to forcible divestiture. The 
Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk and Vance v. Terrazas withdrew from the federal 
government the authority to enforce the duties and obligations of citizenship through the 
withdrawal of citizenship, and placed control over loss of citizenship firmly in the hands 
of the citizen. In the modern era, U.S. citizenship must be characterized primarily as a 
protected legal status,249 guaranteeing the holder the protection of the state and its laws, 
and the full panoply of rights available under the Constitution.   
Understanding how citizenship is treated under U.S. law is a necessary predicate 
to creating and implementing a terrorism-related loss of citizenship consequence in the 
United States. Bills proposed to date fail in part because they appear directed at resolving 
the wrong question. In a system in which citizenship is a privilege enforceable by 
expatriation, “Do you deserve to remain a citizen?” may be a valid question. But in the 
United States, consistent with existing loss of citizenship provisions and legal and 
constitutional restrictions, the question at issue must be, “When, if ever, should joining or 
supporting a terrorist organization be deemed to reflect a citizen’s intention to give up 
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U.S. citizenship?”  It is not sufficient simply to demonstrate that a plausible loss of 
citizenship analysis consistent with existing statutory and constitutional restrictions is 
possible. Crafting an effective bill demands consideration of why loss of citizenship is an 
appropriate solution to the problem at hand. 
Both Senator Cruz’s and Representative Dent’s recent bills are predicated on the 
presumption that “[b]y fighting for ISIS U.S. citizens have expressed their desire to 
become citizens of the Islamic state…[T]he desire to become a citizen of a terrorist 
organization that has expressed a desire to wage war on the American people” is 
inconsistent with a desire to be and remain an American citizen.250 As Representative 
Dent noted, “[a]n individual could make no clearer statement that they have voluntarily 
repudiated their American citizenship than by traveling overseas to join ISIS or any other 
designated terrorist organization.”251 These statements, at least on their face, reflect some 
understanding that the federal government cannot simply take citizenship away from 
individuals involuntarily. Loss of nationality must flow from (1) a voluntary act, that (2) 
was committed with the intention of losing one’s citizenship. Due process requirements 
must be observed when adjudicating a loss of nationality case. Nevertheless, Senator 
Cruz’s and Representative’s Dent’s explanations do not provide a complete answer. 
These statements demonstrate that a plausible terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
analysis is possible, but they don’t answer why loss of citizenship is the right solution.  
B. WHY DO WE NEED LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP TO FIGHT TERRORISM? 
Terrorism as an expatriating act is a thorny problem in part because it often defies 
easy definition and/or application. Proponents of the terrorism-related loss of citizenship 
bills currently pending before Congress argue they are necessary for two reasons. First, 
“the radical Sunni terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
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(ISIS) poses a threat to the national security of the United States.”252 Second, allowing 
U.S. citizens who travels to fight with or support ISIS to come home using a U.S. 
passport, endangers citizens at home.253  Senator Cruz has suggested that his expatriation 
bill is a necessary component of a comprehensive strategy to combat ISIS.254  These are 
common arguments used to support similar legislation overseas. For example, as reported 
by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Immigration Minister Peter Dutton 
explained the reason for its modified loss of nationality law as follows: 
“We face a heightened and complex security environment—regrettably 
some of the most pressing threats to the security of the nation and the 
safety of the nation come to citizens engaged in terrorism,” Mr. Dutton 
said. “The intention of the changes is the protection of the community and 
the upholding of its values rather than punishing people for terrorist or 
hostile acts.”255 
But the relationship between these asserted threats and terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship laws remains to be fully established. Bills previously proposed, and those 
currently pending before Congress, are not clearly directed at resolving any systemic 
weaknesses in U.S. law. As Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court “has never granted the existence in Congress of 
the power to expatriate except where its exercise was intrinsically and peculiarly 
appropriate to the solution of serious problems inevitably implicating nationality…For 
the Court has never held that expatriation was to be found in Congress’ arsenal of 
common sanctions, available for no higher purpose than to curb undesirable conduct, to 
exact retribution for it, and to stigmatize it.”256  While it seems possible under current 
law to craft a constitutionally permissible terrorism-related loss of citizenship law, the 
necessity and/or utility of such a law in this instance has not been demonstrated.   
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It is certainly the case that under current U.S. law, joining the armed forces of a 
foreign nation engaged in hostilities with the United States is a potentially expatriating 
act.257 That statutory expatriating act has its roots in the Nationality Act of 1940, a bill 
conceived and passed into law during the uneasy pause between World War I and World 
War II, and before the key constitutional cases governing our current understanding of 
expatriation were decided. Even despite this heritage, expatriation based on service in a 
hostile foreign military has been subject to searching court inquiry.258  Expanding the 
scope of the law today to include a modern era equivalent—joining the forces of a 
terrorist organization hostile to the United States—may not seem unreasonable on its 
face.259  But the propriety of such a bill cannot be measured by the standards that 
governed the adoption of a seemingly analogous provision 65 years ago. It is unclear 
why, in the present day, a law proposing to interpret an individual’s decision to leave the 
United States for the purposes of joining or supporting ISIS, or another terrorist 
organization or cause, as an expression of the intention to lose U.S. citizenship, is 
necessary to effectively combat ISIS, or terrorism in general. Rather, these post-9/11 bills 
seem more like the legislative equivalent of “loss leaders” in commerce. Loss leaders are 
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unprofitable products sold to attract attention in the market place.260  Proposed terrorism-
related loss of citizenship bills to date have had the character of expedient politically 
motived publicity exercises which lack the substance of genuine efforts to legislate. 
Great care should be taken when using legislation as an expedient vehicle to 
address transitory problems, even problems of genuine significance. Legislation is a tool 
of general applicability that can have broad, lasting, and unexpected effects. A cautionary 
tale from World War II is instructive. 
The only other loss of citizenship law introduced for a similarly specific and 
expedient purpose was the renunciation legislation passed in 1944, presently codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6), INA § 349(a)(6).261  This bill was intended to remedy the perceived 
problem of disloyal interned U.S. citizens supporting a belligerent foreign power. The 
climate in which the bill was passed was infused with inaccurate presumptions based on 
race and identity. The flawed reasoning and assumptions underlying the belief that U.S. 
citizens having Japanese heritage posed a threat to the United States due to inherent 
sympathy or secret support for Japan led to the deplorable relocation and internment of 
thousands and thousands of Americans. Internment, which was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in the since-discredited but yet-to-be-overturned decision, Korematsu v. United 
States,262 created the circumstances under which the egregiously-flawed loss of 
citizenship bill was proposed and passed into law.   
Setting aside the broader societal issues that led first to the internment of United 
States citizens during World War II, and later to passage of novel loss-of-citizenship 
legislation, the legislation itself was poorly conceived and ill-suited to the task for which 
it was designed. In this regard, it failed for two reasons. First, it was implemented under 
plainly coercive circumstances, rendering renunciations easily and appropriately voidable 
through litigation. Second, it failed because, although it was implemented to address the 
narrow problem of disloyal interned United States citizens of Japanese descent, it in fact 
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created a provision of broad applicability that relied on poorly defined terms, and that has 
persisted to create unintended and undesirable future consequences. Presently, wartime 
domestic renunciation has become a cause célèbre for incarcerated criminals and 
sovereign citizens, whose attempts to divest themselves of citizenship burden federal 
resources to no good end.263   
In the modern era, expedient use of loss of citizenship in the context of efforts to 
combat the problem of citizens joining or supporting Islamist terror groups may satisfy 
the desire to ask the question, “Do you deserve to remain a citizen?”  But that is not the 
right question. Citizenship is not a privilege. Citizenship, conceived as a protected legal 
status, demands an answer to the question, “Why is a new loss of citizenship law 
necessary?” 
Alternatives to loss of citizenship exist which could address some of the concerns 
previously raised related to U.S. citizens travelling abroad under a U.S. passport to join or 
support a terrorist organization, and later returning to the United States. H.R. 237, the 
Foreign Terrorist Organization Passport Revocation Act of 2015, would permit the U.S. 
Secretary of State to revoke and/or refuse to issue a passport to an individual who has 
aided or assisted a foreign terrorist organization.264  Similar U.K. legislation, providing 
for the issuance of a temporary exclusion order, would not strip individuals of 
citizenship, but would prevent them from benefitting from rights normally accorded 
citizens, including in the case of the U.S. bill, the right to a valid identity document 
issued by your home government.   
These bills propose to curtail critically important rights associated with 
citizenship. Denying or revoking a passport is a severe sanction, but one that may be 
better tailored to address the transitory problems associated with citizens travelling to join 
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or support foreign terrorist organizations than loss of citizenship, which is among the 
most severe consequences a nation can impose on a citizen.  
C. DRAFTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
To date, terrorism-related loss of citizenship proponents have fallen short in their 
effort to justify the need for such legislation. Nevertheless, efforts to legislate in this area 
persist. Legislators determined to continue drafting and offering terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship legislation to should consider the following.   
1. Define Your Terms — Terrorist Organization and Material Support 
Any legislation purporting to establish a loss of citizenship consequence for 
joining a terrorist organization or materially supporting terrorism should make express 
reference to what those terms mean, and should do so having considered how those 
concepts or terms are dealt with elsewhere in U.S. law.   
To begin with, terrorism is a tactic not limited to groups and organizations 
overseas. There are both domestic and foreign organizations that employ terror as a tool. 
Any law that endeavors to impose a possible loss of nationality consequence for joining 
or supporting a terrorist organization should be clear regarding the question of whether 
the term “terrorist organization” includes both foreign and domestic terrorist 
organizations.  
The U.S. Department of State maintains a list of foreign terrorist organizations, 
which is compiled and maintained pursuant to authority codified at INA § 219.265  There 
is currently no official published list of domestic terror organizations. In addition, 
analysis of what constitutes a terrorist organization, and material support for terrorism 
also occurs in a civil/administrative context elsewhere in the law. In the immigration 
context, INA § 212 renders inadmissible to the United States non-citizens who have 
engaged in terrorism-related activity, including membership in and providing material 
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support to a terrorist organization.266 Material support for terrorism is also a matter 
addressed in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which generally deals with crimes and criminal 
procedure.267  
When drafting hypothetical terrorism-related loss of citizenship legislation, 
legislators should also be aware of the potential conflict that could arise in the context of 
the administration of such a bill and the consideration of terrorism-related inadmissibility 
grounds in the immigration context.   
Adjudication of immigration benefits applications and related matters associated 
with terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds falls to United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. For purposes of this analysis, membership in a terrorist 
organizations is determined with reference to the Department of State’s foreign terrorist 
organizations list, as well organizations found on the separate “terrorist exclusion list,”268 
and in addition “‘undesignated terrorist organizations’ [that] qualify as terrorist 
organizations based on their activities alone without undergoing a formal designation 
process...”269  The Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security, however, are 
afforded the ability to grant exemptions under appropriate circumstances which allow 
admission to the United States of individuals who would otherwise be inadmissible on 
terrorism grounds.270  Legislators should thoroughly consider this related terrorism 
analysis to ensure that unexpected or inconsistent outcomes are avoided. For example, 
legislators may wish to avoid situations in which a citizen might be placed in jeopardy of 
losing his or her citizenship based on association with a group that, in another context, 
                                                 
266 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1952)(as amended). See also 
“Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG),” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  
267 Providing Material Support to Terrorists, 18 U.S.C., § 2339A (1994)(as amended); Providing 
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 18 U.S.C., § 2339B 
(1996)(as amended). 
268 “Terrorist Exclusion List,” U.S. Department of State, accessed September 11, 2016, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm. See also “Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds 
(TRIG)” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  
269 “Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG)” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  
270 “Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds Exemptions,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, accessed September 11, 2016, https://www.uscis.gov/laws/terrorism-related-inadmissability-
grounds/terrorism-related-inadmissibility-grounds-exemptions. 
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would not bar a noncitizen from admission to the United States on terrorism-related 
inadmissibility grounds.  
From a policy standpoint, the scope of a hypothetical terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship statute could be crafted to be broader or narrower than the law, regulations, 
and policies that define the scope of the terrorism-related inadmissibility analysis 
applicable to immigration benefits applicants. Regardless of how legislators decide to 
proceed, the decision should be made with a clear understanding of the potential 
interrelationship between terrorism-related loss of citizenship decisions and other areas of 
law. 
2. Require Alternate Citizenship 
One potential consequence of terrorism-related loss of citizenship would be the 
creation of stateless ex-citizens. A person who, upon losing U.S. citizenship, has no 
alternative citizenship, becomes stateless. The United States is not a signatory to any of 
the United Nations conventions or other international agreements that address the 
creation or treatment of stateless people. In fact, the United States government presently 
holds, as a matter of policy if not law, that a United States citizen is entitled to take action 
that would render him or her stateless.271  This position has prevented the U.S. 
government from requiring, as a precondition to expatriation or renunciation of 
citizenship under existing law, that an individual possess alternate citizenship. The 
foregoing notwithstanding, an argument exists that standards governing the treatment of 
stateless individuals and the creation and avoidance of statelessness have become 
“crystalized as norms of customary international law.”272   
It is reasonable for U.S. legislators to consider drafting legislation that avoids 
unnecessarily creating stateless individuals in the context of proposed terrorism-related 
                                                 
271 “Persons intending to renounce U.S. citizenship should be aware that, unless they already possess 
a foreign nationality, they may be rendered stateless and, thus, lack the protection of any government.” 
“Renunciation of U.S. Nationality,” U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs, accessed 
September 11, 2016, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-
policies/renunciation-of-citizenship.html.  
272  “Expert Meeting, Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness 
resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality, Summary Conclusions,” UNHCR.  
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loss of citizenship. Although it may at first seem counter-intuitive to focus on a 
fundamentally humanitarian concern in the context of hypothetical law addressing 
consequences flowing from joining or providing material support to terrorism, the 
practical realities of loss of citizenship, and the modern conditions under which citizens, 
particularly young citizens, may be coerced or lured into travelling to join or support a 
terrorist group or cause, support the argument that these concerns should not be ignored.   
In this regard, and acknowledging they do have obligations under relevant 
international treaties, the example of our allies is also persuasive. Australia only permits 
terrorism-related loss of citizenship if the individual already possesses alternate 
nationality. While the United Kingdom has not expressly required alternate nationality in 
all terrorism-related loss of nationality situations, it does require a determination that the 
individual at least be eligible for alternate nationality before loss of nationality can occur, 
thus giving serious consideration to statelessness concerns.  
Including an alternate citizenship requirement in a hypothetical future terrorism-
related loss of citizenship law would not weaken previous positions taken by the U.S. 
that, for example, U.S. citizens have a right to renounce their citizenship under 
circumstances that would render them statelessness. Renunciation of citizenship is a 
process exclusively initiated by U.S. citizens, and is subject to a host of warnings and 
advisories.273  Although terrorism-related loss of citizenship, like renunciation, would 
require a process relying on the citizen’s voluntary actions and express or reasonably-
inferred intent, unlike renunciation, terrorism-related loss of citizenship proceedings 
would likely be initiated by the federal government and not the citizen. This is a 
distinction with a difference, particularly where statelessness is the potential 
consequence. Acknowledging the ability of a U.S. citizen, after receiving appropriate 
advisories, to elect statelessness in the context of a renunciation process commenced by 
that citizen is of a different character than a creating statutory provision by which the 
federal government could impose statelessness upon U.S. citizens, even if that 
                                                 
273 “Renunciation of U.S. Nationality,” U.S. Department of State – Bureau of Consular Affairs. See 
also, 7 U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual § 1220 (2015), Developing a Loss-of Nationality 
Case, https://fam.state.gov/fam/07fam/07fam1220.html. 
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consequence were to flow from the voluntary and intentional commission of an 
expatriating act. Imposing statelessness involuntarily upon a U.S. citizen, even in the 
context of a voluntary expatriating act committed with the necessary intent, could be 
viewed as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment to the 
Constitution, as it would bootstrap into our voluntary loss of citizenship scheme a 
particularly severe and, from the perspective of the citizen, potentially unintended or 
unexpected penalty.274  
For these reasons, from both a policy, legal, and practical perspective, it would be 
sensible to treat terrorism-related loss of citizenship differently from voluntary 
renunciation and other loss of citizenship scenarios under U.S. law, and include an 
alternate citizenship requirement.  
3. Loss of Citizenship Should Only Take Effect Overseas 
Consistent with the Australian model, and in recognition of the problems 
associated with creating stateless people in the United States, legislators should ensure 
that any terrorism-related loss of citizenship only take effect once the individual has 
taken up residence outside the United States. Allowing loss of citizenship to take effect 
while a person is in the United States creates a variety of potential problems for the U.S. 
government.   
The ability to live in the United States is inexorably tied to citizenship, or 
acquisition of some other legal status such as asylum, or lawful permanent resident 
status.275  Following loss of citizenship, an individual stands in relationship to the United 
                                                 
274 Compare with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), holding involuntary loss of citizenship for 
desertion of the armed forces during a time of war to be an unconstitutional violation of the 8th 
Amendment.   
275 “Potential renunciants may also express the intention to continue to reside in the United States or 
its territories and possessions without documentation as aliens. Since this right of residency is a 
fundamental right that U.S. citizens and nationals possess, potential renunciants who wish to retain this 
right do not possess the intent necessary for an effective renunciation.” 7  U.S. Department of State  
Foreign Affairs Manual § 1261(h)(2015), Renunciation of U.S. Citizenship Abroad, https://fam.state.gov/
fam/07fam/07fam1260.html.  
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States as an alien, on the same footing as other aliens.276  An individual permitted to lose 
citizenship while in the United States, but who has not acquired an alternate nationality, 
will in most instances find it impossible to leave the United States. The U.S. government 
cannot remove an individual from the United States to another nation without permission 
from the destination nation.277  In all but the most unusual situations, permission will be 
denied regarding anyone not a citizen of the target nation. As such, administrative 
removal by the United States government of a stateless ex-citizen, particularly one whose 
loss of citizenship was related to terrorism, is unlikely to ever occur.   
Further, a stateless ex-citizen would be unable to leave the United States by 
standard modes of international travel. Following loss of citizenship, the individual 
would not be eligible to use or obtain a passport. In the United States, a stateless ex-
citizen would not be eligible for issuance of any other comparable federal travel or 
identity document sufficient for international travel. Absent preexisting nationality or a 
claim to nationality from another nation, a newly stateless ex-citizen would find it 
difficult or impossible to acquire permission from a foreign nation to travel to and take up 
residence in that nation.278  Legally gaining entrance to a foreign nation is impossible in 
most instances absent a properly issued travel document such as a passport, and absent 
advance permission to enter the foreign nation, which commonly takes the form of a visa. 
Airlines would not allow an international traveler lacking such documentation to 
                                                 
276 See e.g., Davis v. INS, 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (D.D.C. 1979)(“The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service argues that the petitioner is neither a citizen nor a national of the United States. He 
therefore qualifies only as an alien who must be excluded under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20). This statute 
requires exclusion if a person does not possess a “valid unexpired immigration visa.” The court agrees with 
the INS and will order the dismissal of the habeas petition.”)   
277 “ICE relies on the cooperation of foreign governments to effectuate removal of their nationals. 
However, ICE often cannot repatriate individuals because certain countries fail to issue required travel 
documents in a timely manner…”  A Review of the Department of Homeland Security Policies and 
Procedures for the Apprehension, Detention, and Release of Non-Citizens Unlawfully Present in the United 
States: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform (2015)(statement of Sarah R. Saldaña, Director U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Testimony/2015/saldana_testimony.pdf. 
278 For example, see the case of Thomas Richard Jolley, who renounced his citizenship in Canada to 
avoid the Vietnam draft, then re-entered the United States, but was deemed a deportable alien. Matter of 
Jolley, 13 I&N Dec. 543 (BIA 1970), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/27/
2039.pdf. See also, John Nordheimer, “A Draft Foe Becomes Man Without Country,” New York Times, 
November 15, 1971 (“If Canada refused to receive Mr. Jolley, which it well might, he would remain 
indefinitely in his homeland, stripped of certain civil rights and under the permanent supervision, but not 
the custody, of immigration officials.”). 
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board.279  Such an individual would be rejected at internal borders. The newly stateless 
ex-citizen would face a challenging, albeit ironic consequence. Having taken action 
deemed to express a voluntarily and intentional loss of United States citizenship, such an 
individual would be trapped in the United States under circumstances that would make 
him unable to leave, and would cause him to be or become a burden to federal, state and 
local authorities.   
Such an outcome should, and indeed can easily be avoided by legislators through 
careful legislative drafting. Section 351 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides 
that loss of citizenship becomes effective for most provisions only upon the individual 
taking up residence outside of the United States.280  Any new terrorism-related loss of 
citizenship provision should be included among those that only take effect once a person 
takes up residence outside United States.  
4. Include a Statutory Presumption Regarding Intent 
For purposes of terrorism-related loss of citizenship, legislators should consider 
incorporating a statutory presumption regarding intent. It is foreseeable in the context of 
terrorism-related loss of citizenship that the federal government may argue an 
individual’s actions reflect the intent to lose United States citizenship, even while the 
individual may dispute that conclusion. Section 349 of Immigration and Nationality Act 
is silent on the meaning of intent, merely reciting that “the burden shall be upon the 
person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”281 In Vance v. Terrazas, the Supreme Court recognized 
that intent could be divined from “words or…as a fair inference from proved conduct.”282  
If intent is susceptible to determination as an inference from proved conduct, it makes 
sense that a statutory presumption, or statutory guidance regarding actions that may be 
deemed to reflect the necessary intent, would be both appropriate and useful.   
                                                 
279 “International Travel Document Requirements,” United Airlines, accessed September 11, 2016, 
https://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/destination/international/passport.aspx.  
280 Immigration and Nationality Act § 351, 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1952)(as amended).  
281 Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b)(1952)(as amended). 
282 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980). 
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While no statutory presumption regarding intent currently exists, the Department 
of State has adopted a limited administrative presumption regarding intent.283 Legislators 
are also encouraged review the structure and content of Australia’s Australian Citizenship 
Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015, which incorporates a statutory 
presumption regarding intent.284  Such a presumption would aid in the administration of 
the new law, provide clearer notice to the public regarding the consequences of their 
actions, and facilitate judicial review. 
5. Wildcard  
An issue about which both proponents and opponents of the concept of terrorism-
related loss of citizenship should be aware is the fact that Afroyim v. Rusk, which 
introduced a novel interpretation of the 14th Amendment, failed to sway four members of 
the court in 1967 and might not be terribly influential to certain members of the court 
sitting today.285  Stare decisis is a principle of decision-making that the Supreme Court 
applies, and that counsels but does not command that the Court defer to its own 
precedent.286  In his influential dissent from Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., Justice 
Louis Brandeis described the application of stare decisis as follows:  
[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled 
its earlier decisions.  The court bows to the lessons of experience and the 
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so 
fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial 
function… The reasons why this court should refuse to follow an earlier 
constitutional decision which it deems erroneous are particularly strong 
where the question presented is one of applying, as distinguished from 
what may accurately be called interpreting the Constitution… Moreover, 
the judgment of the court in the earlier decision may have been influenced 
by prevailing views as to economic or social policy which have since been 
abandoned.  In cases involving constitutional issues of the character 
discussed, this court must, in order to reach sound conclusions, feel free to 
                                                 
283 Certification of loss of U.S. Nationality, 22 C.F.R. § 50.40(a).   
284 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015.  
285 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
286 Wex, s.v. “Stare Decisis,” accessed September 11, 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
stare_decisis.   
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bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly 
ascertained, so that its judicial authority may, as Mr. Chief Justice Taney 
said, “depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is 
supported.”287  
Since Justice Brandeis’ discussion of stare decisis in the 1930s, academics have 
continued to argue about, reconceive, and at times suggest further constraints on the use 
of stare decisis as a tool preventing courts from revisiting decisions of past courts with 
which they disagree.288   
The federal government’s authority to withdraw citizenship from U.S. citizens is 
presently circumscribed by a constitutional boundary, the force of which is inherently 
dependent on the application of stare decisis. Justice Harlan’s detailed and thorough 
dissent from Afroyim v. Rusk is worth reading and considering, regardless of your 
position on the merits of terrorism-related loss of nationality or even on the meaning of 
the 14th Amendment.289  In today’s political climate, in which significant attention is 
given to the makeup of the court, and to the judicial disposition and indeed pre-
disposition that potential new members of the court may bring with them, it is 
conceivable that Afroyim v. Rusk, and its constitutionally-derived principle of 
voluntariness which has become inextricably associated with loss of citizenship in the 




                                                 
287 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–413 (1932)(Brandeis J. dissenting). Justice 
Brandeis’ analysis and assertions regarding stare decisis have been subject to criticism. See e.g., Lee J. 
Strang and Bryce G. Poole, “Historical (In)Accuracy of the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the 
Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for Supreme Court Precedents,” North Carolina Law Review 86 
(2008): 969–1031 accessed September 11, 2016, http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol86/iss4/4. 
288 Nelson Lund, “Stare Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement From the Supreme Court’s 
Errors,”(George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, 12–33), accessed 
September 11, 2016,  http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/
1233StareDecisisand Originalism.pdf.  
289 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268–293 (1967)(Harlan J. dissenting).  
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APPENDIX A. SELECTED EXTRACTS FROM FOREIGN 
TERRORISM RELATED LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION 
A. KEY U.K. LAWS 
The following are excerpts from the British Nationality Act of 1981, as amended: 
§ 40 Deprivation of Citizenship 
§ 40(2) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship 
status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the 
public good. 
§ 40(4) The Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (2) if he is 
satisfied that the order would make a person stateless.  
§ 40(4A) But that does not prevent the Secretary of State from making an order 
under subsection (2) to deprive a person of a citizenship status if— 
(a)  the citizenship status results from the person’s naturalization, 
(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to 
the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, 
has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to 
the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British 
overseas territory, and 
(c) the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory. 
 
 
§ 40A Deprivation of Citizenship: Appeal 
§ 40A(1) A person who is given notice under section 40(5) of a decision to make 
an order in respect of him under section 40 may appeal against the decision to the 
First-tier Tribunal. 
§ 40A(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to a decision if the Secretary of State 
certifies that it was taken wholly or partly in reliance on information which in his 
opinion should not be made public— 
(a) in the interests of national security, 
(b) in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and 
another country, or 
(c) otherwise in the public interest.290 
 
                                                 
290 British Nationality Act of 1981 at §§ 40 and 40A. Immigration Act of 2014 Part 6, Section 66. 
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B. KEY AUSTRALIAN LAWS 
The following are excerpts from the Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015: 
33AA Renunciation by conduct 
Renunciation and cessation of citizenship 
     (1)  Subject to this section, a person aged 14 or older who is a national or 
citizen of a country other than Australia renounces their Australian 
citizenship if the person acts inconsistently with their allegiance to 
Australia by engaging in conduct specified in subsection (2). 
Note 1:  The Minister may, in writing, exempt the person from the 
effect of this section in relation to certain matters: see 
subsection (14). 
Note 2:  This section does not apply to conduct of Australian law 
enforcement or intelligence bodies, or to conduct in the 
course of certain duties to the Commonwealth: see 
section 35AB. 
     (2)  Subject to subsections (3) to (5), subsection (1) applies to the following 
conduct: 
       (a)  engaging in international terrorist activities using explosive or lethal 
devices; 
       (b)  engaging in a terrorist act; 
       (c)  providing or receiving training connected with preparation for, 
engagement in, or assistance in a terrorist act; 
       (d)  directing the activities of a terrorist organisation; 
       (e)  recruiting for a terrorist organisation; 
        (f)  financing terrorism; 
       (g)  financing a terrorist; 
       (h)  engaging in foreign incursions and recruitment. 
     (3)  Subsection (1) applies to conduct specified in any of paragraphs (2)(a) to 
(h) only if the conduct is engaged in: 
       (a)  with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; 
and 
       (b)  with the intention of: 
          (i)  coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the 
Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or 
of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or 
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           (ii)  intimidating the public or a section of the public. 
     (4)  A person is taken to have engaged in conduct with an intention referred to 
in subsection (3) if, when the person engaged in the conduct, the 
person was: 
       (a)  a member of a declared terrorist organisation (see section 35AA); or 
       (b)  acting on instruction of, or in cooperation with, a declared terrorist 
organisation. 
     (5)  To avoid doubt, subsection (4) does not prevent the proof or establishment, 
by other means, that a person engaged in conduct with an intention 
referred to in subsection (3). 
     (6)  Words and expressions used in paragraphs (2)(a) to (h) have the same 
meanings as in Subdivision A of Division 72, sections 101.1, 101.2, 
102.2, 102.4, 103.1 and 103.2 and Division 119 of the Criminal 
Code , respectively. However, (to avoid doubt) this does not include 
the fault elements that apply under the Criminal Code in relation to 
those provisions of the Criminal Code . 
     (7)  This section does not apply in relation to conduct by a person unless: 
       (a)  the person was not in Australia when the person engaged in the conduct; 
or 
       (b)  the person left Australia after engaging in the conduct and, at the time 
that the person left Australia, the person had not been tried for 
any offence related to the conduct. 
     (8)  Subsection (1) applies to a person who is an Australian citizen regardless 
of how the person became an Australian citizen (including a person 
who became an Australian citizen upon the person’s birth). 
     (9)  Where a person renounces their Australian citizenship under this section, 
the renunciation takes effect, and the Australian citizenship of the 
person ceases, immediately upon the person engaging in the conduct 
referred to in subsection (2). 
Minister to give notice 
     (10)  If the Minister becomes aware of conduct because of which a person has, 
under this section, ceased to be an Australian citizen, the Minister: 
       (a)  must give, or make reasonable attempts to give, written notice to that 
effect to the person: 
          (i)  as soon as practicable; or 
           (ii)  if the Minister makes a determination under subsection (12)—as soon 
as practicable after the Minister revokes the determination 
(if the Minister does so); and 
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       (b)  may give notice to that effect to such other persons and at such time as 
the Minister considers appropriate. 
Note:   A person may seek review of the basis on which a notice under 
this subsection was given in the High Court of Australia 
under section 75 of the Constitution, or in the Federal Court 
of Australia under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 . 
     (11)  A notice under paragraph (10)(a) must set out: 
       (a)  the matters required by section 35B; and 
       (b)  the person’s rights of review. 
     (12)  The Minister may determine in writing that a notice under 
paragraph (10)(a) should not be given to a person if the Minister is 
satisfied that giving the notice could prejudice the security, defence or 
international relations of Australia, or Australian law enforcement 
operations. The Minister must consider whether to revoke such a 
determination: 
       (a)  no later than 6 months after making it; and 
       (b)  at least every 6 months thereafter until 5 years have passed since the 
determination was made. 
 
35 Service Outside Australia In Armed Forces of an Enemy Country or a 
Declared Terrorist Organization 
 
Cessation of citizenship 
     (1)  A person aged 14 or older ceases to be an Australian citizen if: 
       (a)  the person is a national or citizen of a country other than Australia; and 
       (b)  the person: 
          (i)  serves in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia; or 
           (ii)  fights for, or is in the service of, a declared terrorist organisation (see 
section 35AA); and 
       (c)  the person’s service or fighting occurs outside Australia. 
 
Note 1:  The Minister may, in writing, exempt the person from the effect of this 
section in relation to certain matters: see subsection (9). 
 
Note 2:  This section does not apply to conduct of Australian law enforcement or 
intelligence bodies, or to conduct in the course of certain duties to the 
Commonwealth: see section 35AB. 
 
     (2)  The person ceases to be an Australian citizen at the time the person 
commences to so serve or fight. 
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     (3)  Subsection (1) applies to a person who is an Australian citizen regardless 
of how the person became an Australian citizen (including a person who became 
an Australian citizen upon the person’s birth). 
     (4)  For the purposes of subparagraph (1)(b)(ii) and without limitation, a 
person is not in the service of a declared terrorist organisation to the extent that: 
       (a)  the person’s actions are unintentional; or 
       (b)  the person is acting under duress or force; or 
       (c)  the person is providing neutral and independent humanitarian assistance. 
35A Conviction for terrorism offences and certain other offences 
Cessation of citizenship on determination by Minister 
     (1)  The Minister may determine in writing that a person ceases to be an 
Australian citizen if: 
       (a)  the person has been convicted of an offence against, or offences against, 
one or more of the following: 
          (i)  a provision of Subdivision A of Division 72 of the Criminal Code ; 
           (ii)  a provision of section 80.1, 80.1AA or 91.1 of the Criminal Code ; 
          (iii)  a provision of Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (except section 102.8 or 
Division 104 or 105); 
          (iv)  a provision of Part 5.5 of the Criminal Code ; 
           (v)  section 24AA or 24AB of the Crimes Act 1914 ; 
          (vi)  section 6 or 7 of the repealed Crimes (Foreign Incursions and 
Recruitment) Act 1978 ; and 
       (b)  the person has, in respect of the conviction or convictions, been 
sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 6 years, or to 
periods of imprisonment that total at least 6 years; and 
       (c)  the person is a national or citizen of a country other than Australia at the 
time when the Minister makes the determination; and 
       (d)  the Minister is satisfied that the conduct of the person to which the 
conviction or convictions relate demonstrates that the person has 
repudiated their allegiance to Australia; and 
       (e)  having regard to the following factors, the Minister is satisfied that it is 
not in the public interest for the person to remain an Australian 
citizen: 
          (i)  the severity of the conduct that was the basis of the conviction or 
convictions and the sentence or sentences; 
           (ii)  the degree of threat posed by the person to the Australian community; 
          (iii)  the age of the person; 
          (iv)  if the person is aged under 18—the best interests of the child as a 
primary consideration; 
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           (v)  the person’s connection to the other country of which the person is a 
national or citizen and the availability of the rights of 
citizenship of that country to the person; 
          (vi)  Australia’s international relations; and 
         (vii)  any other matters of public interest. 
Note:   A person may seek review of a determination made under this 
subsection in the High Court of Australia under section 75 of 
the Constitution, or in the Federal Court of Australia under 
section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 . 
     (2)  The person ceases to be an Australian citizen at the time when the 
determination is made. 
     (3)  Subsection (1) applies to a person who is an Australian citizen regardless 
of how the person became an Australian citizen (including a person 
who became an Australian citizen upon the person’s birth). 
     (4)  For the purpose of paragraph (1)(b): 
       (a)  the reference to being sentenced to a period of imprisonment does not 
include a suspended sentence; and 
       (b)  if a single sentence of imprisonment is imposed in respect of both an 
offence against a provision mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) and in 
respect of one or more other offences, then: 
          (i)  if it is clear that only a particular part of the total period of 
imprisonment relates to the offence against the provision 
mentioned in paragraph (1)(a)—the person is taken to have 
been sentenced to imprisonment in respect of that offence 
for that part of the total period of imprisonment; and 
           (ii)  if subparagraph (i) does not apply—the person is taken to have been 
sentenced to imprisonment in respect of the offence against 
the provision mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) for the whole of 
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APPENDIX B. LOSS OF NATIONALITY BY NATIVE-BORN OR 
NATURALIZED CITIZEN — 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (INA § 349) 
(a) A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or 
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the 
following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality-  
 
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application or 
upon an application filed by a duly authorized agent, after having attained 
the age of eighteen years; or  
 
(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of 
allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having 
attained the age of eighteen years; or  
 
(3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if  
(A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States, or  
(B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned 
officer; or  
 
(4)  (A) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, 
post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political 
subdivision thereof, after attaining the age of eighteen years if he has or 
acquires the nationality of such foreign state; or  
      (B) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, 
or employment under the government of a foreign state or a political 
subdivision thereof, after attaining the age of eighteen years for which 
office, post, or employment an oath, affirmation, or declaration of 
allegiance is required; or  
 
(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or 
consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as 
may be prescribed by the Secretary of State; or 
 
(6) making in the United States a formal written renunciation of 
nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer 
as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United 
States shall be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve 
such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense; or  
 
(7) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to 
overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, violating or 
conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section 2383 of title 18, 
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United States Code, or willfully performing any act in violation of section 
2385 of title 18, United States Code, or violating section 2384 of said title 
by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force 
the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, if and 
when he is convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 292 
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